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TEN QUESTIONS
I. DOES A TERRORISM SUSPECT WHO IS NOT A CITIZEN OF THE
UNITED STATES HAVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IF INTERROGATED
OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES?
A. Stephen Vladeck
Yes. (If only I could stop there ... )
First, it's worth clarifying just what this question is asking. The
scope appears to include non-citizens, lawfully within the United
States at the time of their detention, who are subsequently
transferred overseas. In that case, I think there would be little
question that the Due Process Clause applies, although I imagine
there would be disagreement about just how much process is
actually due.
The harder part of this question is for those non-citizens who
have never had any substantial contact with the United States, who
are picked-up, held, and interrogated outside the territorial United
States. Whether this category includes the Guantanamo detainees
(or whether Guantanamo is "different"), is a separate issue unto
itself-albeit one arquably resolved by the majority and concurring
opinions in Rasul. For other non-citizens held elsewhere,
including, most prominently, Afghanistan and Iraq, this question
really has two elements: a doctrinal element-i.e., does present-day
American constitutional law recognize any claim to due process on
the part of such detainees; and a theoretical element-i.e., whether
it does or not, should it.
Taking the doctrinal element first, everything turns, of course,
on how one reads the Supreme Court's 1950 decision in Johnson v.
2Eisentrager. Some, including Chief Justice Rehnquist in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,3 read Eisentrager for all it's worth, and
contend that it categorically precludes extraterritorial due process
rights for all non-citizens. Others think Eisentrager should be
limited to its facts-to non-citizens fighting for a nation-state with
which we were formally at war, who conceded their status as
belligerents and contested only whether they could be tried by
4military commission.
1. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment).
2. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
3. 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76 (differentiating the petitioners'
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Both sides of the debate, however, tend to spend little time
looking at Justice Jackson's majority opinion in Eisentrager itself-
and it's a fascinating read. Solicitor General Clement once
referred to it as a case with "an awful lot of alternative holdings,"5
and that's putting it mildly. True, Jackson eventually concluded
that the petitioners were not entitled to habeas corpus because they
had no rights to enforce on the merits, but only after exhaustively
walking through their claims. If Eisentrager meant to enunciate a
categorical rule, it strikes me that the actual gravamen of the
petitioners' claims should have been irrelevant. Rather, as I have
written elsewhere, my view of Eisentrager is as a case decided more
on the merits-that any possible rights the petitioners may have
had simply were not violated, and so the unavailability of habeas
corpus raised no possible constitutional infirmity.
Of course, my view is hardly the prevailing consensus. So the
hardest part of this question is the prescriptive part-should these
detainees have due process rights? Here, I retreat to (my) first
principles: if the animating purpose of the Due Process Clause is to
constrain arbitrary governmental takings of life, liberty, and
property, that purpose strikes me as having universal applicability.
Indeed, the entire purpose of the Bill of Rights was to reject the
argument often heard today in the context of non-citizens detained
outside the territorial United States-that there are spheres where
the federal government's powers are unbounded. So my
conclusion would be that the Due Process Clause acts upon the
government anywhere that the government acts.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that the same process is due to
non-citizens held outside the territorial United States. What
process is due, of course, depends upon the circumstances. And I,
for one, would have little trouble with the idea that non-citizens
captured by U.S. soldiers on a foreign battlefield in the context of
active combat operations are entitled to exceedingly little process.
But however minimal that process is, it must be more than nothing.
situation from the "six critical facts" presented in Eisentrager) .
5. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (No. 05-184), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral
arguments/argumenttranscripts/05-184.pdf.
6. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship,
and Article I1, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1527-31 (2007); Stephen I. Vladeck, The
Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REv. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 29, available at http://ssm.com/absract=1020265).
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B. Geoffrey S. Corn
No, with qualification. As a general proposition, non-resident
aliens subject to U.S. control outside the territory of the United
States derive no protection from the Due Process Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. They may, however, benefit from analogous
protections derived from international law, such as the humane
treatment obligation reflected in the provisions of Common Article
3 to the Geneva Conventions. But unlike the Due Process Clause, it
is unclear what type of relief would be available for such a violation
of international legal obligations.
This conclusion is based on several Supreme Court decisions,
including Johnson v. Eisentrage7 and United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez. It is also based on the longstanding doctrine of male
captus, bene detentus reflected in the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. These
authorities all indicate that individual constitutional protections are
fundamentally linked to nationality or territoriality. They provide
little authority for what would in essence be a passive, personality-
based extension of constitutional rights-an application on the
nationality of the actor and not the subject of the alleged violation.
Accordingly, non-resident aliens with no meaningful connection to
the United States who have been subjected to abduction, trial by
military court, and search and seizure have been unable to
effectively invoke constitutional protections to challenge their
treatment at the hands of U.S. government agents.
The more difficult question is whether this presumptive
inapplicability is without limit. The Supreme Court has indicated
that such a limit does exist, prohibiting government actors from
engaging in conduct that "shocks the conscience." In Rochin v.
California, the Supreme Court established this "shocks the
conscience" exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine.9 This exception
has, however, rarely been effectively invoked, and has not been
extended to conduct unrelated to international abduction.
Nonetheless, cases involving its invocation have focused on whether
an individual was physically or mentally abused in the process of
being brought to U.S. jurisdiction, suggesting that evidence of such
abuse could be used to challenge the assertion of U.S. jurisdiction
7. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
8. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
9. 342 U.S. 165, 171-73 (1952); see also United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d
267, 273 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing Rochin's impact on the Ker-Frisbie doctrine).
2008] 5011
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over an individual in the future.
One of the most interesting examples of how difficult it is for a
defendant to assert this exception in order to raise a due process
challenge to the means by which he was brought into U.S.
jurisdiction is the case of General Noriega.10 When brought before
a U.S. court on criminal charges, the General asserted, inter alia,
that the use of approximately 25,000 U.S. troops to invade Panama
in order to abduct him was per se conscience-shocking. The trial
court rejected this claim, focusing not on the technique used to
secure his presence before the tribunal, but instead on his
treatment once under the control of U.S. authorities.
These precedents create a good-faith basis to presume the
inapplicability of the Due Process Clause to non-resident aliens
detained outside the territory of the United States. But they also
provide a caution to U.S. government agents that abusive treatment
may result in altering this presumption.
C. Tung Yin
The Supreme Court has, to date, declined to answer this
question, preferring to resolve the terrorism cases it has heard
since 2004 on statutory interpretation grounds. In Rasul v. Bush,"
for example, the Court held merely that Guantanamo Bay
detainees were entitled to file habeas petitions pursuant to the
federal habeas corpus statute-a limitation to the decision that
12paved the way for the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which
purported to strip most of that jurisdiction from the federal courts.
It also led to the minimalist analysis in Khalid v. Bush, in which a
district judge essentially said that he was applying Rasul in allowing
the detainees to file their petitions, but that they had no
constitutional rights and therefore their petitions were denied.
3
Whether aliens outside the United States have due process
rights depends in part on how you read Johnson v. Eisentrager,14 a
1950 decision involving German citizens convicted of war crimes
10. See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
11. 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
12. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005, 119 Stat.
2680 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
13. 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D.D.C. 2005), vacated by Boumediene v. Bush, 476
F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1478 (2007), reh'ggranted and order
vacated byA] Odah v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 3067 (2007).
14. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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and imprisoned in the U.S.-controlled portion of Germany. Like
many opinions authored by Justice Robert Jackson, it is a mixture
of perfectly crafted phrases and maddening ambiguity. (How
exactly, for example, is one supposed to resolve power struggles
between the President and Congress that fall into the "twilight
zone" of the Steel Seizure analysis?) As the Bush administration has
read it, Eisentrager stands for the proposition that aliens being
detained outside the United States have no constitutional rights at
all, and there is a strain of Justice Jackson's opinion that supports
such a reading. On the other hand, Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in Rasul read Eisentrager much more narrowly, as applying
only when the aliens have already been convicted in a military
tribunal (and even then, he concluded that Eisentrager was probably
no longer good law, since the case it relied on had been
overruled).
Answering this question calls for legal maneuvering on par
with Odysseus's trip past Scylla and Charybdis. On the one hand, a
conclusion that aliens outside the country have no due process
rights would leave them at the mercy of the President, a position at
odds with the spirit of separation of powers and checks and
balances. On the other hand, a conclusion that aliens outside the
United States have due process rights leaves open the possibility
that in a traditional war, enemy POWs might be able to flood U.S.
courts with habeas petitions. It would also be in tension, if not
outright conflict, with precedents holding that aliens seeking entry
into the United States are subject to Congress's plenary powers
over immigration.
I have developed in more detail elsewhere an argument that
the Guantanamo detainees should in fact be entitled to due
process to challenge their status as enemy combatants and,
assuming confirmation of such status, their continued detention. 6
Essentially, I see a difference in our obligations toward aliens who
are seeking affirmative benefits from us (such as would-be
immigrants) versus those who are seeking to be left alone by us
(such as military detainees). Many of the legal rules denying
constitutional rights to aliens located outside the United States fall
into the former category, including the immigration plenary
power. Recognizing this distinction, however, need not open the
15. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79.
16. See Tung Yin, Procedural Due Process to Determine "Enemy Combatant" Status in
the War on Terrorism, 73 TENN. L. REv. 351 (2006).
20081 5013
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floodgates to lawsuits by prisoners of war during conventional
armed conflicts between nations, because a properly conceived of
"enemy alien disability" rule could bar from courts those citizens of
nations with which the United States is at war-a conclusion that
would comport with such precedents as Eisentrager and Ludecke v.
Watkins.7
Thus, my conclusion is that terrorism suspects detained and
interrogated outside the United States do have due process rights.
D. Norman Abrams
The question of whether a terrorism suspect who is not a
citizen of the United States has due process rights if interrogated
outside the territory of the United States can be addressed as a
purely legal question. It is also suggestive, however, of practices
alleged to have been carried on by U.S. agents abroad, namely,
seizing a suspected terrorist and turning him over to authorities in
another country where coercive methods of interrogation are
applied. Accordingly, this issue has some linkage to the subject of
extraordinary rendition discussed later in this series.
There are some relevant cases that are helpful in addressing
the legal issues raised by this question, though they are few in
number and only lower court decisions. While the question only
focuses on due process rights, to complete the legal picture, it is
helpful also to address the question of whether the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and consequently
Miranda warnings, are applicable. It is also useful to make
alternative factual assumptions regarding the interrogation-such
as whether it was conducted by or with the participation of U.S.
agents; whether coercive methods were used; and finally, whether
the issue arises in the course of a criminal prosecution in a U.S.
court where there is a challenge to the admissibility of statements
or their fruits resulting from the interrogation.
If the interrogation was conducted by or with the participation
of U.S. agents, and the suspect's resulting statements are offered
into evidence against him, the decision in United States v. Bin
Laden,"' described by the court as a matter of first impression,
stands for the proposition that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination applies to the suspect. Accordingly, the
17. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
18. 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
5014 [Vol. 34:5
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failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings is a basis for suppressing
his custodial statements, "notwithstanding the fact that his only
connections to the United States are his alleed violations of U.S.
law and his subsequent U.S. prosecution. In reaching this
conclusion, the judge relied on the doctrine that "the
extraterritorial situs of the interrogation is not dispositive since the
Constitution is violated when a defendant's compelled statement is
used against him as evidence, and not when he is coerced into
making it in the first place. "2°
The court then went on to require "principled, but realistic
application of Miranda's . . . warning/waiver framework,""
requiring, for example, that the suspect be told he has a right to
remain silent (even if he has already spoken to the foreign police),
and that the U.S. agents communicate both the existence of the
right to counsel and impediments to its exercise depending on the
circumstances, such as the fact that no U.S. lawyer may be available,
no lawyer may be provided by the foreign sovereign, and foreign
law might even bar lawyers from entering the station house.
Finally, in a noteworthy footnote, the court in Bin Laden stated:
It bears reiteration that the issues addressed by this
Opinion relate solely to the admissibility of statements in
an American court. This is not the same question as the
ability of American law enforcement or intelligence
officials to obtain intelligence information from non-
citizens abroad, information which may be vital to
national security interests.22
The question of whether the involuntary statements of a U.S.
citizen obtained in a foreign country by foreign police are
inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was posed in United States v. Abu Ali. ' The court
concluded that the statements were voluntary, but the court's
reasoning clearly accepted the proposition that the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause was applicable.
In United States v. Karake,24 the court reached the proposition at
which the question posed above seems to have been aimed. The
defendants were Rwandan nationals, members of the Liberation
19. Id. at 181.
20. Id. at 182 n.9 (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 185-86.
22. Id. at 189 n.19.
23. 395 F. Supp. 2d 338 (E.D. Va. 2005).
24. 443 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2006).
50152008]
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Army of Rwanda, who were charged with the killings of two U.S.
tourists in Uganda. The court ruled that the statements obtained
by Rwandan officials were the product of coercion and involuntary
and, therefore, inadmissible under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
In Karake, non-U.S. citizens interrogated by non-U.S. police in
a foreign country were given the benefit of the protection of the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause in a U.S. courtroom. But,
as the Bin Laden court pointed out, that protection operates when
the statements are offered into evidence in a U.S. courtroom, not
at the time the coerced statements are obtained.
The question posed is therefore not the same issue as the
ability of U.S. intelligence agents "to obtain intelligence
information from non-citizens abroad, information which may be
vital to national security interests. 2  Query whether the
government views due process as operating in that context.
E. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
As a nation that supports and stands for universal human
rights, any human being detained or interrogated should be
treated with dignity and respect-regardless of whether a U.S.
26citizen or not. However, for a non-U.S. citizen being interrogated
outside of the United States, due process will not, does not, and
should not be at the same level as that envisioned by our
Constitution.
This has become problematic for many within the mainstream
media. The discussions about due process are often conducted
without discussion of what is meant by due process and what it
entails. Is the need for due process focused upon whether or not
substantive due process or procedural due process is afforded and
to what extent? Also, many of the protections afforded in our own
due process jurisprudence, such as the exclusionary rule, are to
prevent introduction of such statements later at Article III courts.
The questioning conducted on the individuals at issue here is
typically not intended to be introduced in U.S. courts. The
Constitution was drafted with the intent of preventing the
government from interfering or overextending its authority over
25. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189 n.19.
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
5016 [Vol. 34:5
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those within the United States. There is some debate over whether
citizenship is the key or whether just residing within the United
States is sufficient, but that question is not posed here. The
question is whether a non-citizen outside of the United States has
due process rights. Thus, the rebuttable presumption is that no
due process rights are required for non-citizens.
However, some rights need to be given to those persons being
interrogated by U.S. government entities. Rights, such as the
complete abstention from torture, are legally required by both U.S.
domestic law and international law. The United States must be
certain to not lose its identity as a leader in human rights when
conducting interrogations. Thus, interrogations should be
conducted in accord with Common Article 3 of the Geneva
• 28
Conventions, the Convention against Torture (CAT), and theAmerican ethos of promoting human dignity.
II. MAYA UNITED STATES CITIZEN WHO IS DESIGNATED AN ENEMY
COMBATANT BE HELD IN A SECRET PRISON?
A. Stephen Vladeck
The first question here is whether a U.S. citizen can be held as
an "enemy combatant" in any circumstance. Justice Scalia and
Justice Stevens, as we know, think that the answer is "no."2 0 Even if
they are wrong, at a bare minimum, express congressional
authorization should be a necessary prerequisite.
Assuming, though, that there is such authorization, the
question whether a U.S. citizen "enemy combatant" can be held in
a secret prison is really two different questions: first, can it be a
secret that the U.S. citizen is being held in the first place; and
second, even if it cannot be secret, can the location where a U.S.
27. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
28. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
29. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554-79 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
30. See id. at 539-54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and
concurring in the judgment); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power,
22 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 153, 155-157, 190-195 (2004) (arguing that express
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citizen is being held be kept secret? And to me, at least, such
bifurcation of the question makes it exceedingly easy to answer.
To the first sub-question: No. The United States cannot
secretly detain a U.S. citizen. For me, the real issue here is judicial
review. If one believes, as I do, that all U.S. citizens have a right to
judicial review of any extrajudicial detention (except and unless
habeas corpus has been validly suspended), it is difficult to
reconcile such a right with detention, the fact of which is a secret.
This is not to say that courts can never review secrets. Of course,
we know that's not true.31 But it is hard to see how a U.S. citizen
whose detention is a secret would be able to get into court in the
first place, let alone have a court review the substance of his claims.
Second, on the assumption that the fact of detention is not a
secret, I have no problem with the location of detention being
withheld from public scrutiny. As I said above, the real issue to me
is whether the secrecy precludes meaningful oversight and judicial
review of the detention. Although I think it would frustrate review
if the fact of detention were kept secret, I am hard pressed to see
how keeping the location secret would preclude a meaningful
inquiry into the detention, so long as the petitioner were able to
meaningfully contest the legality, and potentially the conditions, of
his confinement. Indeed, we have examples to the contrary.
Take the case of John Demjanjuk, an alleged World War II
concentration camp guard ("Ivan the Terrible") who was arrested
and eventually extradited to Israel to stand trial for war crimes."
While Demjanjuk was awaiting extradition, he was detained by U.S.
marshals at an undisclosed location. Although his habeas petition
challenging his extradition was denied on the merits, the D.C.
Circuit had no problem exercising jurisdiction, analogizing his case
to others where U.S. citizens held abroad challenged their• 33
detention. Thus, if the facial legality of secret detention turns on
the detainee's ability to meaningfully challenge that detention, as I
believe it does, Demjanjuk suggests that the mere fact that the
location of detention is a secret would not itself preclude judicial
review.
31. See, e.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th
Cir. 2007) (holding that "the very subject matter of the litigation-the
Government's alleged warrantless surveillance program under the TSP-is not
protected by the state secrets privilege.").
32. For a survey of the complicated procedural history, see United States v.
Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2004).
33. See Demjanjuk v. Meese, 784 F.2d 1114,1115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
5018 [Vol. 34:5
12
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/2
TEN QUESTIONS
B. Geoffrey S. Corn
No. This question implies, first, that the Executive has
"designated" a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant. Implicated by
this first question is the constitutional sufficiency of the process
used for such a designation, including the ability of such a citizen-
detainee to confront the evidence used in the determination and
to have an impartial fact finder determine the issue. A plurality of
the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld concluded that Congress
had authorized the detention of citizens who qualify as enemy34
combatants, as that term is narrowly defined in the case. Thus,
the Court held Congress had met the restrictions of the Anti-
Detention Act when it passed the Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks.s However, the Court identified Hamdi's interest as "the
most elemental of liberty interests-the interest in being free from
physical detention by one's own government, "36 and a majority
agreed that a "citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the
factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut
the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision
maker."
3 7
Despite a citizen-detainee's Fifth Amendment right to contest
his determination as an enemy combatant, the scope of this right is
unclear if he is captured and held entirely outside the jurisdiction
of the United States. Both Reid v. Cover?8 and United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez39 recognize that when the United States acts
against citizens abroad, the Bill of Rights still applies. Citizens
abroad may, accordingly, invoke the protection of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments, but secret detentions deprive citizens of an
opportunity to challenge the legality of government action through
judicial process. In addition, such secrecy disables any practical
opportunity for detained citizens to petition the other branches of
government for relief against unrestrained power of the Executive,
or to inform the People of their government's actions.
34. 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
35. Id. (referring to the Anti-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. 4001 (a) (2000), and
the AUMF, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (Sept. 18, 2001)).
36. Id. at 529.
37. Id. at 533.
38. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
39. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
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Additionally, this question implicates the obligations of a
detaining power under the laws of war. Characterizing the
detainee as an enemy combatant suggests two critical predicates
have been established. First, that the detainee was captured in
association with an armed conflict. Second, that the detainee is not
qualified for status as a prisoner of war pursuant to the Third
Geneva Convention. This removes the detainee from the
protection of the treaty-based obligation imposed on detaining
powers to provide notice to the prisoner's government "within the
shortest possible period" of the existence of detention.
The inapplicability of this treaty obligation does not, however,
result in the conclusion that it is permissible to hold detainees not
qualified as prisoners of war in secret detention. Instead, the issue
of secret detentions raises the question of whether such detentions
are incompatible with the humane treatment obligation enjoyed by
all individuals detained in association with an armed conflict. This
humane treatment obligation is codified in a variety of treaty
provisions (such as Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949, Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, and
Article 4 of Additional Protocol II).4' However, it has evolved to
become widely accepted as a fundamental principle of the law of
war applicable as customary international law independent of
treaty-based application. Accordingly, it protects any individual
who has become hors de combat for any reason, including as the
result of capture.
Acknowledging the customary nature of the humane
treatment obligation reflected in Common Article 3 leads to the
key question in regard to secret detentions: is transparency of the
existence of detention a component of humane treatment? It is
undeniable that nothing in the text of Common Article 3, nor any
other humane treatment oriented treaty provision, expressly
addresses transparency of detention. However, the significance of
the obligation to provide timely notification of the existence of
detention for both prisoners of war and civilian detainees pursuant
40. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
41. See id. at art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of
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to the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions indicates that
transparency of detention is central to the humane treatment of
captives.
An even more compelling argument in support of this
conclusion is based on a simple pragmatic consideration:
transparency of detention is integrally connected with the physical
protection of detainees. Notice of the existence of detention
imposes a powerful check on the abuse or killing of detainees for
the simple reason that the detaining power will ultimately have to
account for such treatment. It is, therefore, no accident that
allowing a prisoner of war to send a "capture card" at the inception
of detention is an established right-for such correspondence
assures the prisoner that the detaining power will ultimately be
held to account for his status.
Secret detention eliminates this check against arbitrary
detaining power treatment of detainees, and sends a powerful
message to detainees that they are at the true mercy of the
detaining power. Such an outcome is inconsistent with the
customary treatment of individuals who have been made hors de
combat by capture, and ultimately inconsistent with the humane
treatment all detainees are entitled to expect.
C. Tung Yin
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,42 it
seems rather inconceivable that the executive branch could detain
an American citizen in a secret prison-at least, if what one means
is whether the executive branch could unilaterally detain a citizen
secretly. In Hamdi, five members of the Court agreed that,
pursuant to Congress's November 18, 2001 joint resolution
authorizing the use of military force, the President had the legal
authority to detain a United States citizen as an enemy combatant."
Two others thought that Congress possibly could authorize
detention of citizens but had not done so clearly in the
42. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
43. See id. A plurality of the Court, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Breyer resolved the question purely on the basis
of interpreting the AUMF. Id. at 517. Justice Thomas agreed that the AUMF
confirmed such authority, but indicated a belief that the President's inherent
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Authorization for Use of Military Force,44 and two more argued that
U.S. citizens could not be detained militarily absent suspension of
45
the privilege of habeas corpus.
Moving beyond the power to detain, however, a majority of the
Court then reached the issue of what process, if any, was due an
American citizen detained as enemy combatant. Here, six
members of the Court agreed that, at a minimum, a citizen would
be entitled to a hearing before a neutral decision maker in which
the citizen could challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant, and that the citizen would be entitled to the assistance
of counsel during such a hearing.
46
Given the requirements of a hearing before a neutral decision
maker and entitlement to counsel, how would the President
lawfully detain an American citizen in a secret prison? I suppose it
is possible that the government might hold the citizen in a secret
location and bring the citizen elsewhere for meetings with counsel
and for the hearing. After all, Hamdi appeared to limit the right to
counsel to the status hearing itself, and not for other purposes
(such as challenging the conditions of confinement) .4' However, I
take it that this is not the sort of "secret detention" being asked
about, because the government would have a much harder time
keeping secret its behavior toward the detainee.
Therefore, no, I do not believe that the United States can hold
a U.S. citizen designated as an enemy combatant in a secret prison.
D. Norman Abrams
What this question highlights is how much government secrecy
we encounter today and how little we really know about what the
government is doing. We have no information about any U.S.
citizens other than Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla having been
designated as enemy combatants. I assume that there are no other
cases, but if someone challenged that assumption, I would have to
concede that I cannot be absolutely certain about the matter-
because of government secrecy.
What is meant by a "secret prison"? Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen,
was designated as an enemy combatant and transferred to a navy
44. Id. at 539 (Souter,J. and GinsburgJ., concurring).
45. Id. at 554 (ScaliaJ. and Stevens,J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 533, 539.
47. See id. at 539 ("He unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in
connection with the proceedings on remand.").
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brig in another state. We knew where he was located, but for years,
he was not given access to the outside world-to friends, family, or
counsel. Was he in a "secret prison"? I assume not, though his
detention had some similar elements.
The question builds on the reports that the CIA seized
individuals abroad and kept them in secret prisons, the location of
which we still only suspect. As far as we know, the individuals thus
seized and interrogated have since been released, transferred to
other countries, or transferred to the U.S. facility at Guantanamo
Bay. But because of governmental secrecy about this program, we
cannot really be certain. As far as we know, no U.S. citizens have
been seized abroad in this way.
As far as we know, no U.S. citizen, other than Jose Padilla, has
been seized in the United States and designated as an enemy
combatant and, again as far as we know, none have been held in
some unknown secret prison. Suppose, however, that a U.S. citizen
were seized abroad, someone like John Walker Lindh or Yaser
Hamdi. Might they be taken to a secret prison as allegedly
happened to some non-U.S. citizens seized abroad?
Because of governmental secrecy, such events could occur, and
we might not know about them. So as a practical matter, the
answer to the question is "yes," such an event could occur if
government agents were so-minded to make it happen.
But what about legal recourse? If the hypothetically-detained
U.S. citizen were subsequently prosecuted, would that not present a
context where the legality of the detention could be tested? Well, it
would at least present a context where the detention in a secret
prison could no longer be kept secret, but unless statements or
evidence obtained in the course of the detention were offered into
evidence, it is doubtful that the legality of the detention would be
481taken into account by the court.
Governmental secrecy cuts in two directions. It is probably
perceived by the government as protective and beneficial insofar as
it permits the government to conceal some of the things it is doing
and prevents the public from knowing what the government is
actually doing. But it also makes it possible for the public to
suspect the government of doing all kinds of terrible things that in
fact it may not actually be doing. And when the public begins to
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distrust the government and to suspect it of doing bad things, that
is not a good thing for the government, the public, or our
democratic system of government.
E. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Yes, a United States citizen may be held in a secret prison, but
it would require express congressional approval. One additional
consideration is important: the detention of any person in a secret
prison runs counter to some experts' opinions on the state of
49international law in this area.
For purposes of this response, a "secret prison" includes the
detention of an individual where there is no public disclosure of a
person's detention, and the person is held incommunicado.
49. There is active movement to ban this practice under international law.
The practice is opined to be illegal under at least one international instrument:
experts have declared Article 9, paragraph 1, of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), makes this practice illegal. Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, Report of the Chairperson of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention: Situation of Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 84, delivered to the Commission on
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 5, 2006) (noting violations of
ICCPR art. 9, Dec. 12, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368). The American
Society of International Law adopted a resolution on March 30, 2006, stating inter
alia that "[p]rolonged, secret, incommunicado detention of any person in the
custody or control of a state is prohibited by international law." Amer. Soc'y of
Int'l Law, Resolution of March 30, 2006, http://www.asil.org/events
/am06/resolutions.html; see also the International Convention for the Protection
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED), GA Res. 61/177, opened for
signature on Feb. 6, 2007, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
disappearance-convention.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2008). The prohibition of
enforced disappearance into customary international law may be premature, given
that nations continue the practice. See Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances, delivered to Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/2 (Jan. 10,
2008) available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/
7session/A-HRC-7-2.doc (last visited Mar. 26, 2008) (reporting that it has
investigated over 50,000 disappearance since 1980 and has received reports of over
eighty disappearances from a variety of countries during 2007). Consider too that
only thirteen of the thirty-four members of the Organization of American States
are bound by the Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of
Persons, 33 ILM 1529 (1994), available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/
English/Treaties/a-60.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2008).
50. Of course, this infers a denial of at least some constitutional rights for a
detained U.S. citizen. Note that in today's context, this would meet the definition
of enforced disappearance in the ICCPED, see supra note 49. As of January 31,
2008, it had seventy-nine signatories and one party (Albania). For a list of
signatories, see http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/16.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2008).
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President Bush has admitted that the United States used secret
prisons in the past, although not to detain U.S. citizens.
5'
Hamdi v. Rurnseld demonstrates the diverse views on detention
of a U.S. citizen. The controlling opinion is a four-justice
plurality, joined by a two-justice concurring opinion, to vacate and
remand the case back to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Considering
all four opinions, all nine justices would agree that a U.S. citizen-
enemy combatant could be detained if Congress suspended the
writ of habeas corpus.
Another domestic legal authority on the matter, the Non-
Detention Act, provides that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained . . . except pursuant to an Act of Congress." 53
Language of the six justices resulting in the Hamdi remand also
would likely agree that congressional action comporting with the
Non-Detention Act would also suffice to allow for detention of a
U.S. citizen.
Notwithstanding prospective combined political branch
action, the Founders anticipated the dangers of arbitrary
imprisonment and highlighted the safeguard provided by the writ
of habeas corpus to counter this practice. The Federalist No. 84,
quoting Blackstone, is prescient:
To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to confiscate
his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross
and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey
the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to
jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a
less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous
engine of arbitrary government.
We suggest that the United States, through the executive and
legislative branches, indeed has the power to detain U.S. citizens in
51. Bush Admits to CIA Secret Prisons, B.B.C. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/5321606.stm (last visited Mar.
26, 2008). President Bush has intimated that the United States no longer practices
this.
52. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
53. P.L. 92-128, 85 Stat. 347 (1971) (codified in part at 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (a)
(2000).
54. The quote continues: "[a]nd as a remedy for this fatal evil he is
everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the habeas corpus act, which
in one place he calls "'the bulwark of the British Constitution."' THE FEDERALIST
No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS 468 (2002) (emphasis in the original).
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secret prisons. Also, the Executive alone, under the Article II
powers, has the authority under limited, extreme circumstances.55
However, such actions must have the necessary conditions
precedent and be reported to the citizenry as soon as practicable.
III. WHAT ARE THE LIMITS TO EXECUTIVE DISCRETION FOR
DECLARING OR RECOGNIZING MARTIAL LAW?
A. Stephen Wadeck
I have written about this precise issue in some detail before,
and have suggested that the President would actually have fairly
broad discretion, in an emergency situation, to recognize or
declare a state of martial law. 6
The key here is the definition: What do we mean by "martial
law"? As Chief Justice Chase explained in his concurring opinion
in Milligan:
There are under the Constitution three kinds of military
jurisdiction: one to be exercised both in peace and war;
another to be exercised in time of foreign war without the
boundaries of the United States, or in time of rebellion
and civil war within states or districts occupied by rebels
treated as belligerents; and a third to be exercised in time
of invasion or insurrection within the limits of the United
States, or during rebellion within the limits of states
maintaining adhesion to the National Government, when
the public danger requires its exercise. The first of these
may be called jurisdiction under MILITARY LAW, and is
found in acts of Congress prescribing rules and articles of
war, or otherwise providing for the government of the
national forces; the second may be distinguished as
MILITARY GOVERNMENT, superseding, as far as may be
deemed expedient, the local law, and exercised by the
military commander under the direction of the President,
with the express or implied sanction of Congress; while
55. To illustrate limited and extreme circumstances, consider a scenario
where Congress could not meet, see Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1761), or
where a short term detention arose from a battlefield capture of an unlawful
combatant.
56. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, Emergency Power and the Militia Acts, 114 YALE
L.J. 149, 193 (2004); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, The Field Theory: Martial Law, the
Suspension Power, and the Insurrection Act, 81 TEMPLE L. REV. (forthcoming 2008)
(manuscript at 4648, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=963994).
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the third may be denominated MARTIAL LAW PROPER, and
is called into action by Congress, or temporarily, when the
action of Congress cannot be invited, and in the case of
justifying or excusing peril, by the President, in times of
insurrection or invasion, or of civil or foreign war, within
districts or localities where ordinary law no longer
adequately secures public safety and private rights.
Assuming, then, that the question refers to "martial law
proper," I believe that the so-called "Insurrection Act '5 8 delegates
authority to the President to assert such crisis authority where, as
Chase wrote, "ordinary law no longer adequately secures public
safety and private rights." It should be emphasized, though, that
those circumstances are exceedingly dire, and the authority can
only be exercised for as long as the exigency of the situation
requires. As the Court reaffirmed in the Hawaiian martial law case,
"'civil liberty and this kind of martial law cannot endure together;
the antagonism is irreconcilable; and, in the conflict, one or the
other must perish.'
59
B. Geoffrey S. Corn
Martial law is one of the most elusive legal concepts in the
realm of national security law. The uncertainty related to when
martial law may be legitimately imposed is created by two primary
realities. First, the Constitution provides no express authority for
the imposition of martial law. Second, because martial law
represents the epitome of authoritarian rule, federal courts have
been historically cautious, if not reluctant, to acknowledge the
legitimacy of such government power. Nonetheless, on several
occasions during our history, the Supreme Court has suggested
that martial law may be justified and legitimate under the right
conditions of extremis. Even Justice Jackson, in his famous
concurrence in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer decision-an
opinion openly hostile to the proposition that emergency creates
power in government-excluded from his rejection of executive
power ex necessitate "the very limited category" of martial law.6°
57. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141-42 (1866) (Chase, C.J.,
concurring).
58. 10 U.S.C. § 333 (2000).
59. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324 (1946) (quoting Milligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 124-25).
60. 343 U.S. 579, 650 n.19 (1952) (Jackson,J, concurring).
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The most notable Supreme Court decision touching on the
question of martial law was Ex parte Milligan, a case in which the
Court was required to rule on the propriety of subjecting a U.S.
citizen (who was not a member of a hostile armed force) to the
61jurisdiction of a military tribunal. In order to resolve this issue,
the Court analyzed whether the imposition of military jurisdiction
over Milligan could be justified as the result of the existence of
martial law. Although the Court rejected such ajurisdictional basis
in that case, in so doing it provided important insight into the
possible legitimacy of martial law, and the predicate conditions
upon which such an assertion of government authority must rest.
On the question of legitimacy, the Court ruled by implication
that had the conditions necessary to justify the imposition of
martial law been present, the assertion of military jurisdiction over
Milligan would have been legitimate. This was a clear indication
that although not provided for in the Constitution, martial law has
historically been recognized as an inherent power of the federal
government.
More importantly, the Court provided an indication of the
conditions that must exist in order to justify the imposition of
martial law: a total breakdown of civil authority. In the context of
subjecting a citizen to a criminal prosecution, this was defined as an
inability for the civil courts to operate. However, the logical
inference from this definition is that an imposition of martial law
will only be legitimate in response to a situation that destroys or
disables the ability of civil government to maintain law and order.
Accordingly, imposition of martial law by a President could never
be justified absent such a situation of extremis.
C. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Martial law is not mentioned in the Constitution. The tag
itself is a misnomer: there is no martial "law." It is more
appropriate to term it "martial rule, for it is little else than the will
,62of the [Executive], applie [d] to all persons .... " Whatever we
call it, limits do exist to constrain the Executive's ability to declare
martial law. However, in the world in which the government
operates today, there seems to be greater guidance for when major
catastrophes occur-such as terrorist attacks, or other events
61. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
62. See Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266, 293 (1878) (Field, J., dissenting).
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potentially requiring such action. As a result, it is clear there needs
to be greater exploration, debate, and clear guidance on these
issues.
The seminal case on "martial law" is Ex parte Milligan.6
Milligan applied for a writ of habeas corpus after being tried and
convicted before a military commission for rebellious activities in
Indiana, at the time under martial law, during the Civil War.
Milligan applied to the federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus;
the Supreme Court ultimately agreed, ordering his release because
his confinement was unlawful. The Court asserted that any
declaration of martial law in Indiana was invalid, as the state was
not occupied by the Confederacy: "[m]artial law cannot arise from
a threatened invasion. The necessity [for martial law] must be actual
and present; the invasion real," such that the civil courts were
"effectively" closed and civil administration "depose [d] ."64
However, martial law must be distinguished from a state of
emergency declared under state or federal law. States of
emergency inhere broad powers to the Executive at both levels. A
2006 amendment to the Insurrection Act expanded the
circumstances that the President may employ the armed forces
domestically. 65 The President may now use the armed forces to
restore public order due to "natural disaster, epidemic, other
serious health emergency, terrorist attack or incident . . . ." where
the President determines inter alia that state authorities are
"incapable of maintaining public order., 66  This should raise
eyebrows about use of emergency powers, particularly when one
considers the urgency in response and recovery that a large-scale
terror attack, i.e. a man-made disaster, may trigger. The conflation
of broad emergency powers with the President's commander-in-chief
powers, where an ability to declare martial law would lie, would
67provide the Executive with awesome power.
63. 71 U.S. (4. Wall.) 2 (1866).
64. Id. at 127.
65. John W. Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, P.L. 109-
364, § 1076, 120 Stat. 2083, 2404 (2006) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 333).
66. Id. § 1076(a) (1), 120 Stat. at 2404.
67. Every President since Nixon has claimed inherent commander-in-chief
powers, and Congress recognized this when it passed the National Emergencies
Act of 1974. See National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255
(1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
There, Congress expressly did not override several declared presidential
emergency declarations, including the 1950 national emergency declaration on
the war on the Korean peninsula, because they flowed from the President's Article
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We suggest the President, under his Article II powers, has the
authority to declare martial law in limited circumstances: a
rebellion or invasion is a condition precedent to a declaration, and
it may involve only the affected areas. Such actions need to be used
in a judicious manner and its use and basis should be reported to
the Congress and the citizenry as soon as practicable.
IV. SHOULD CONGRESS PROHIBIT EXTRAORDINARY OR IRREGULAR
RENDITION?
A. Stephen Viadeck
This question assumes that Congress has not already prohibited
extraordinary rendition. If we define "extraordinary rendition" to
mean the removal of detainees to third-party countries for the
purpose of subjecting them to interrogation methods that would be
illegal under U.S. law, I think there is a very good argument that
such conduct is already prohibited by federal law (and I agree that it
should be so proscribed).
Under Article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), "[n]o State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
,,68torture. Congress has implemented the United States' CAT
obligations in section 2242 of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA) .69 As section 2242 (a) provides:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel,
extradite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any
person to a country in which there are substantial grounds
for believing the person would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States. 70
Thus, whether or not a detainee potentially subject to
II powers. Harold C. Relyea, National Emergency Powers, CRS Report No. 98-505
(Aug. 30, 2007).
68. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), art. 3, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TRAryDoc. 100-
20 (1988) 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
69. Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822-2681-823 (codified
at8 U.S.C. § 1231 note).
70. Id. § 2242 (a), 112 Stat. at 2681-822.
5030 [Vol. 34:5
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [2008], Art. 2
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss5/2
TEN QUESTIONS
extraordinary rendition could himself challenge his removal," U.S.
statutory law prohibits such a practice.
B. Geoffrey S. Corn with Dru Brenner-Beck
Yes. Current international treaties and domestic U.S.
legislation, in present form, do not clearly prohibit extraordinary
renditions. Congressional action is needed to clarify stated U.S.
policy that the United States does not transport anyone to a
country where it believes they will be tortured. "Extraordinary" or
"irregular" renditions are terms "used to refer to the extrajudicial
transfer of a person from one State to another, generally for the
purpose of arrest, detention, and/or interrogation by the receiving
State."72 The U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT) and
implementing U.S. domestic legislation prohibit the transfer of
persons to countries where there are "substantial grounds for
believing' they would face torture.73  Unfortunately, both the
Convention and the legislation are susceptible of limiting
interpretations that arguably permit extraordinary or irregular
renditions to occur.
First, neither prohibits the rendition of persons to States where
they would be subject to harsh treatment, including treatment that
would be prohibited if done by U.S. authorities, that does not rise
to the level of "torture." Torture, under the Convention, is seen as
a particularly severe form of cruel treatment. Second, diplomatic
assurances from the receiving State that the person will not be
tortured can at least facially satisfy the requirements of the CAT
71. Because CAT is arguably "non-self-executing," there is a colorable claim
that it cannot be privately enforced except as provided by FARRA. For an
argument to the contrary, see Ogbudinkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 218-20 (3d
Cir. 2003). Although the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §
106(a)(1)(B), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)), supersedes
Ogbudimkpa's holding with respect to non-citizens who can raise CAT claims in
removal proceedings, see, e.g., Kamara v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 209-11
(3d Cir. 2005), the Third Circuit's analysis of the availability of habeas relief
should still apply to all other cases.
72. Michael John Garcia, Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture,
CRS. No. RL 32890, CRS-1 (Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://digital.library.
unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-7695:1.
73. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREArY Doc. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85. This language has been implemented at 8 U.S.C § 1231; 8
C.F.R. § 1208.18(a) (1).
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and implementing domestic legislation since it arguably eliminates
the "substantial grounds for believing" that the person would face
torture. Further, it is unclear whether the CAT would prohibit
rendition where the United States seizes a suspect outside the
territory of the United States and directly renders them to another
country, a process termed extra-territorial renditions. The State
Department has asserted that the United States does not interpret
CAT Article 3 protections to apply to persons outside U.S. territory.
While the implementing legislation prohibits the involuntary
return of any person when there are reasonable grounds for
believing the person would be in danger of being subject to torture
"regardless of whether the person is physically present in the
United States," the statute contains an exception instructing federal
agencies to exclude from the protection of CAT-implementing
regulations aliens who are reasonably believed to pose a danger to
the United States, to the maximum extent such exclusions are
consistent with CAT obligations.
Although the 1949 Geneva Conventions impose limitations on
renditions separate from those imposed by CAT, these protections
would apply only to specified categories of people, individuals
qualifying for the protections of the Conventions, in armed conflict
or post-conflict occupied territory. These protected categories are
quite narrow in the context of the Global War on Terror, and
provide limited protections against irregular renditions.
Because of the dangers that narrow or parsing interpretations
of the relevant international treaties and domestic laws pose to the
stated policy of the United States that we will not transfer persons
to States where they will be tortured, Congress should pass
legislation to clearly prohibit irregular or extraordinary rendition.
The challenge, of course, will be to develop an effective definition
of what is "irregular" or "extraordinary", and what process the
Executive must follow to assure compliance with the prohibition.
Legislation has in fact been introduced in both the 109th and
110th Congresses to limit the authority of U.S. entities to render
persons to other States. Provisions in such measures have included,
inter alia, the requirement for the Secretary of State to report to
Congress a list of States where there are substantial grounds for
believing that torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is
commonly used in the detention of or interrogation of individuals,
and the prohibition of any transfer to such States, subject to waiver
Secretary of State in limited circumstances including continuing
5032 [Vol. 34:5
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access to the person by independent humanitarian organizations.
While the challenge of developing an effective statutory
proscription for this activity is undeniable, it is equally undeniable
that the existing legal framework is too susceptible to
manipulation. The credibility of the United States as a nation that
rejects the abusive treatment of individuals subject to its power
therefore necessitates that, at a minimum, Congress clarify the
conditions that make renditions impermissible, and that the
prohibition on rendition applies irrespective of where the detainee
was first taken into U.S. custody.
C. Tung Yin
On the subject of extraordinary rendition, where the detainee is
captured in one country and transferred extrajudicially to a second
country, primarily for the purpose of interrogation, I note the
observation of former CIA agent Reuel Marc Gerecht: "A cardinal
rule of the intelligence business . . . is to maintain control of the
individuals you are debriefing or interrogating., 4  Gerecht
persuasively argues that extraordinary rendition is therefore an
operationally-flawed technique, even if one believes that coercive
interrogation is called for in particular circumstances, because the
United States gives up control of the interrogation subject to a
third country.
Whether Congress should-and can-intervene to prevent the
executive branch from pursuing a flawed policy, however, is a more
challenging question. To a large extent, I suspect that one's answer
will depend on whether one views rendition as a tactical decision,
akin to the selection of military targets, or as a policy decision, such
as the prohibition on torture as codified in the torture statute. If it
is the former, then Congress probably cannot intrude on the
President's prerogative.
I would argue that extraordinary rendition is sufficiently
analogous to torture (if not identical) and that Congress can and
should pass legislation to regulate, if not prohibit it altogether. To
the extent that the President believes it necessary in a given case to
resort to extraordinary rendition,75 the action should be justified ex
74. See STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE
PROcRAM 259 (2006).
75. This would be an appropriate place for an obligatory reference to the
"ticking time bomb" scenarios so popular on Fox's 24.
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post under a necessity defense.
D. Norman Abrams
With few exceptions, Congress has been reluctant to try to
intervene in actions by the U.S. government outside the United
States that involve the pursuit of terrorists and the prevention of
terrorism. Does Congress's failure to take action on the
international scene reflect its unwillingness to rein in the executive
branch on issues that are perceived as serving the national interest
or, rather, reflect its view that this is an area where Congress lacks
the authority to limit the executive branch?
Many people believe that they know a great deal about the
practice of extraordinary rendition, but very little of what is
thought to be known has come from official sources, and we
cannot be certain about the reliability of this unofficial
information. To the extent that official sources have publicly
revealed anything, it has come from the highest levels of the
government, namely the President and the Secretary of State, but
they have not revealed any details.
Extraordinary rendition may take different forms, and our
reaction to the practice may vary with the version. Rendition is
generally defined as the practice of transferring a wanted person
from the country in which he is found to the country where he is
wanted (for prosecution, incarceration [assuming a prior
conviction], or questioning) without going through formal
extradition procedures. It is usually done with the cooperation of
the country in which the individual is found. For example, the
individual having been arrested in one country is turned over to
the agents of the other country, put on an airplane the destination
of which is the agents' country.
Just what makes rendition extraordinary? And what is the
United States accused of having done? In some instances,
government agents are suspected of seizing individuals in a foreign
country against their will and, with the cooperation of that country,
transferring the individuals to the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Or in
similar circumstances, transferring the seized person to another
country where the individual is detained, interrogated (possibly
using coercive methods, i.e., torture) and possibly tried and
convicted. Or the seizure allegedly occurs without the cooperation
of the first country, indeed, through acts that violate the laws of
that country, and the person is subsequently transferred elsewhere,
5034 [Vol. 34:5
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whether to Guantanamo or to another country.
Occasionally, but not very often, the actions of the government
in seizing a person abroad and transferring him to U.S. custody
without going through extradition or using ordinary rendition
techniques have surfaced in judicial opinions. Consider the
stratagem used in bringing the defendant in United States v. Yunis7
into U.S. custody, as described by the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia:
Immediately after the hijacking, several United States
agencies, led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
sought to identify, locate and capture the hijackers.
Government efforts after several months of investigation
focused on Yunis as the probable ringleader of the five
hijackers.
The FBI then recruited as a government informant Jamal
Hamdan, a Lebanese acquaintance of Yunis ....
After the investigation had produced sufficient evidence,
the FBI obtained a warrant for Yunis's arrest. Hamdan
lured Yunis from Lebanon to international waters off the
coast of Cyprus under the ruse of conducting a narcotics
deal. On September 13, 1987, Hamdan and Yunis
traveled on a small motor boat to a yacht manned by FBI
agents who apprehended Yunis shortly after he -boarded
the yacht. From the yacht, they transferred Yunis to a
United States Navy munitions ship, the U.S.S. Butte, which
carried him to the aircraft carrier, the U.S.S. Saratoga. A
military aircraft transported Yunis from the U.S.S. Saratoga
to Andrews Air Force Base outside of Washington, D.C.
He was subsequently arraigned in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia."
An instance of extraordinary rendition, or not? And, of
course, the Supreme Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain,7
ruled that a person kidnapped in Mexico by U.S. agents and
brought to the United States could be tried by a U.S. court.
Extraordinary rendition?
Congressional efforts to obtain information from the executive
branch and to investigate the practice of extraordinary rendition
have thus far been largely frustrated. Possibly, with a new
76. 867 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
77. Id. at 618-19.
78. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
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administration after the upcoming election, we shall learn more
about the practice.
But the idea of legislating regarding the practice, whatever
forms are deemed unacceptable, is an idea fraught with
complexity. The Bush administration invokes all the possible bases
for executive branch authority in support of its anti-terrorist efforts:
the fact that we are at war; the President's role as Commander in
Chief; the foreign affairs power; and the President's inherent
executive authority, and responsibility for national security. Any
effort to restrict its ability in this area would be likely to create a
major constitutional confrontation. Whether a future
administration will take a different position remains to be seen.
But again, first things first: Congress should attempt to
investigate, not legislate. Decisions about legislation can come
later, once Congress has before it information about the kinds of
extraordinary rendition practices that have really been utilized.
E. Amos Guiora
Rendition violates the 1984 Convention against Torture
(CAT) 79 which unequivocally states that a detainee held by one
country may not be turned over to another country if there is a
reasonable belief that the receiving country will torture the
detainee. The significance of the Convention is clear: the nation
holding a detainee is responsible for that individual's welfare until
his release and may not "use" another nation's interrogation
services for purposes of torture. In other words, the Convention
prevents (or at least seeks to prevent) circumvention of relevant
domestic legislation preventing torture.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States "turned over"
detainees to a variety of nations known to torture (according to
various media reports the "receiving" nations included, among
others, Egypt, Morocco, Indonesia, and Jordan). While a
misbegotten belief that "by all means necessary" justified such an
approach, the policy violated both the international Convention
and U.S. law (the Convention was ratified by the Senate).
It is important to state what rendition is: it facilitates a "bypass"
of legislation preventing torture. That is, the detainee is turned
79. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
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over to the intelligence service of another country known to engage
in torture. Rendition, crudely stated, is the outsourcing of torture.
In a recent article published in the Harvard Human Rights
Journal, David Weissbrodt and Amy Bergquist wrote:
The Committee against Torture has published two
findings that are particularly relevant to the practice of
extraordinary rendition. In Khan v. Canada, the
Committee determined that by transferring a person to a
country that was not a party to the Convention against
Torture, Canada violated Article 3, both because the
transfer would subject the person to a danger of torture,
and because the transfer would make it impossible for the
person to apply for protection under the Convention
against Torture. In Agiza v. Sweden, the Committee
against Torture determined that Sweden's use of
extraordinary rendition in December 2001 violated Article
3. With U.S. assistance, the government of Sweden seized
Egyptian asylee Ahmed Agiza and transported him to
Egypt. The Committee found that "it was known, or
should have been known, to [Sweden]'s authorities at the
time of [Agiza] 's removal that Egypt resorted to consistent
and widespread use of torture against detainees, and that
the risk of such treatment was particularly high in the case
of detainees held for political and security reasons." The
Committee also determined that "an inability to contest
an expulsion decision before an independent authority..
[is] relevant to a finding of a violation of article 3"
because it violates "the procedural obligation to provide
for effective, independent and impartial review required
by article 3 of the Convention." The Committee rejected
Sweden's argument that it had obtained assurances from
the government of Egypt to ensure that Agiza would not
be ill-treated. A recent report by the Special Rapporteur
on torture confirms that extraordinary rendition violates
Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. s°
F Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Extraordinary or irregular rendition has occurred throughout
the 20th century. In particular, these governmental national
security actions have occurred since the beginning of the Cold War.
80. David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human
Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTs.J. 123, 143-44 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
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The difference today in such actions, abhorrent to most (if not all)
Americans, is that the twenty-four hour media coverage has made
an otherwise unaware public and citizenry now painfully aware that
these actions do, and often must, occur in order to protect the
nation. One need look no further than the recent controversy of
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planes carrying detainees which
stopped on islands controlled by the United Kingdom to refuel.
The CIA Director had to personally apologize to the British
Government for these actions-even though stops were simply to
refuel and absolutely no interrogation took place on British soil.
The media covered this throughout the world.
To a large degree, the question is not so much whether
Congress can interfere in this area largely envisioned to be carried
out by the executive branch, but rather the extent of Congress's
oversight role for such operations if, and when, they do occur.
Constitutionally, such actions fall within the role of the executive
branch in carrying out national security operations and cannot be
prohibited by the legislative branch. This is even truer in the age
of international terror and in our current armed conflict against al
Qaeda. The need for information and the interests in keeping
such actions out of the public view are of even greater priority. The
need for secrecy, dispatch, and rapid response is all the greater in
the current world struggle against international terror. Congress
interference in what is clearly an executive function is counter-
productive to achieving victory.
Thus, although Congress does not have the authority to
prohibit extraordinary or irregular rendition, they should be kept
informed of such actions and be updated periodically. The Senate
and House Intelligence Committees, in closed, classified briefings,
should be kept abreast every six months of the status of any
renditions to ensure the Executive is not abusing his constitutional
authority or using such power in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
V. DOES CONGRESS HAVE THE POWER TO PASS END DATES FOR THE
WAR IN IRAQ OR WOULD THAT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ENCROACH ON
THE EXECUTIVE'S COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF POWERS?
A. Stephen Wadeck
No one doubts that Congress has the power to start a war. And
Congress, in a 2002 statute, provided statutory authority for the war
5038 [Vol. 34:5
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in Iraq."' Thus, I do not think there is any limitation on Congress's
power to repeal the 2002 authorization, assuming (for the sake of
argument) either that the President signs such a measure or that
Congress overrides a veto. To me, placing "end dates" on the
offensive use of troops in Iraq is the same as repealing the use of
force authorization. I am hard pressed to see how, if Congress can
do the latter, it cannot do the former.8
2
Instead, the question to me is not whether Congress can enact
such measures, but whether such measures would be judicially
enforceable in the face of countervailing Article II arguments. In
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that "[w]hether or
not the President has independent power, absent congressional
authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its• 1 ., •,,83
own war powers, placed on his powers. If the same logic applied
here, then I think such limits would be judicially enforceable,
notwithstanding arguments that such limits infringe upon the
President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief.
84
On this issue, there is much to learn from the Vietnam-era
precedents, especially with respect to the use of military
appropriations to support operations in and over Cambodia. As
just one example, Congress in 1973 enacted a measure providing
that,
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after
August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance
directly or indirectly combat activities by United States
military forces in or over or from off the shores of North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
'8 5
Although there was substantial (and ultimately unsuccessful)
litigation over whether this provision (the Fulbright Amendment)
81. See Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-243, § 3, 116 Stat. 1498, 1501.
82. Cf United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347, 348 (1952) (per
curiam) (recognizing an Act of Congress as formally ending World War II against
Germany).
83. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2774 n.23 (2006).
84. See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief
at the Lowest Ebb.-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121
HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) (recounting, in great detail, the scope of such power).
85. Act ofJuly 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 130, 134. See generally
Thomas F. Eagleton, The August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of Congress, 52 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 225 (2007).
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or a host of others precluded bombing operations in Cambodia
86prior to August 15, there was no question as to its effectiveness as of
that date.
Nor is the Vietnam experience unique. As Professors Bradley
and Goldsmith acknowledge, Congress has in other circumstances
placed express temporal limits on delegated military authority. Of
course, these examples do not themselves answer the question. But
practice suggests that Congress has done so before, and academic
arguments, such as those offered by Professors Barron and
Lederman, suggest that Congress could do so again.
B. Geoffrey S. Corn
The answer to this question may depend on the form of the
legislation. Assuming the legislation took the form of a restriction
on appropriations, there seems to be solid authority for the
binding nature of such a restriction. Indeed, this is precisely the
method used by Congress in 1973 to force a termination of all
military operations in Southeast Asia, a law signed by President
Nixon after a compromise on the termination date and
subsequently implemented by him. Congress has also used its fiscal
power to limit the type of forces authorized to be used in military
operations against Serbia in 1999 when it prohibited the
introduction of ground forces into that conflict, and to place an
end date on the presence of U.S. forces in Lebanon in 1983.
Use of an appropriations limitation would require sufficient
support to overcome presidential opposition in the form of a veto.
However, once enacted, there is virtually no basis for a President to
flagrantly defy such a limitation. It is, however, arguable that the
President's inherent power to defend U.S. forces could justify
limited deviations from such a restriction in the event the President
concluded that compliance would endanger U.S. forces during the
withdrawal process. This would in turn require the President to
divert funds from other statutory sources, which would create a
87genuine risk of violating the Anti-Deficiency Act.
Whether Congress could impose such a restriction through a
non-fiscally related statute is less certain, although seemingly
86. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 361 F. Supp. 553, 565-66 (E.D.N.Y. Jul.
25, 1973), rev'd, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that in the absence of
congressional authorization, the President and the military personnel under his
direction would be enjoined from engaging in combat operations in Cambodia).
87. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2000).
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academic (because the support required for such a statute would
also permit Congress to use its fiscal powers to impose a
complimentary restriction). Several early Supreme Court decisions
related to the Quasi-War with France suggest that the power to
initiate war implies the power to place limits on the scope of war
once authorized. In these cases, the President found no support
for ordering transgressions of these limits based on his judgment
that the tactical situation justified such transgression. Instead, the
Court clearly indicated that because Congress has the power to
authorize war, limits contained in such authorizations are binding
on all departments of the government. Thus, although subsequent
congressional practice has been to rely on appropriations power to
impose such limits, there is no reason to conclude that a statute
demanding termination of hostilities would have any less effect.
C. Tung Yin
Congress unquestionably has the authority to repeal the
November 18, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF), which is simply a piece of legislation despite being titled a
'Joint resolution." Passing legislation that sets an "end date" in the
future is functionally equivalent to repealing the AUMF at that
same future date. The state of war between the United States and
Germany during World War II did not officially and technically end
with the peace treaty signed by the parties, but, rather, persisted
until the early 1950s, when Congress ended the state of war by
statute.
The more interesting question is whether such congressional
action would obligate the President to withdraw U.S. troops from
Iraq. The lines in this debate have been drawn clearly. On one
side lie scholars such as Harold Koh, Louis Fisher, and John Hart
Ely, who argue that the Declare War Clause gives Congress the
power to commit the nation to war. Presumably then, Congress's
determination to end the state of war-or, in today's parlance, to
withdraw the AUMF-would require the President to cease using
the armed forces in Iraq. On the other side lie scholars such as
John Yoo, who contend that Congress's primary control over the
use of the armed forces is not through the Declare War Clause, but
rather the power of the purse: "Congress undoubtedly possessed
the power to prevent or end the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
50412008]
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Kosovo; it simply chose not to use it.''88 These scholars would likely
argue that, notwithstanding any congressionally-mandated end
dates to the Iraq war, the President would remain free to keep
troops in Iraq for so long as Congress is willing to appropriate
funds for such purposes.
An important part of Yoo's thesis is that failure of political will
is distinct from structural failure. So long as Congress could have,
but chose not to, stop the President from engaging in military
(mis) adventures, it cannot complain that it has not authorized
those actions. In other words, Yoo seeks to maintain and highlight
accountability by each of the political branches, rather than
allowing one to act passive-aggressively, as Congress does by simply
not voting to declare war (or to authorize military action). In this
regard, it is important to keep in mind that legislation that sets an
end date to the Iraq war (or repeal of the AUMF) requires an
affirmative act by Congress. Therefore, I would argue that such
congressional action, especially if successfully overriding a
presidential veto, should be viewed as obligating the President to
comply.
D. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Congress does not have the power to pass end dates for the
Commander in Chief and to do so would be catastrophic not only
for the current war in Iraq but for future administrations' ability to
carry out their duties as Commander in Chief. Congress had its
opportunity to object to the Iraq war when its members
overwhelmingly voted to authorize military action against Iraq in
2003. This does not imply that Congress remains powerless today.
Constitutionally, it can cut off all funding for the war effort and
thereby achieve its objective while remaining within the confines of
its constitutional role. The best means to analyze, without
hyperbole or politics, the roles of the executive and legislative
branches regarding warfare and foreign affairs roles is to review the
original intent of the Constitution.
The Founders clearly intended for the foreign affairs power to
be vested in the Commander in Chief. The legislature was
understood to be ill-equipped for battlefield decision-making and
war-fighting. Its role was intended to be limited to determining the
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jus ad belium, or declaration of war-thus ensuring the citizenry
supported the need for armed conflict. But once the action is
granted, Congress's role is relegated to simply controlling the
"purse strings." The need for flexibility in the Executive, so
eloquently penned by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers,
is even more important today as the enemies we fight have
extraordinary technological capabilities, often do not wear
uniforms, and engage in civilian atrocity as doctrine.
The foreign affairs power-particularly war-fighting-has
been, was, and remains quintessentially the province of the
executive branch. The history of executive power in the area of
foreign affairs, and military operations in particular, is abundant
with examples of the Founders' intent. Their intent, partially in
response to the Articles of Confederation failures, placed the
commander-in-chief powers clearly within Article II of the
Constitution.
One way to discern the Founders' intent on foreign affairs is
through the lens of the meaning of executive power at the time of
the Constitution's creation. The 18th century meaning of the term
"executive power" clearly included the foreign affairs power as well
as the power to execute the laws within the domestic United States.
Thus, the Founders, aware of the failures of the Articles of
Confederation in foreign affairs, military affairs, and the execution
of laws, sought to remedy these problems with vesting such power
in the Presidency.
Some scholars passionately look to the pre-revolutionary
period, and the revolutionary period itself, to assert the Founders
were rejecting the Crown and intended the Legislature to be the
strongest branch. In some areas this is true-particularly with
regard to domestic affairs. However, these critics, such as Louis
Fisher or Harold Koh," rely upon the strength of the legislatures
during this period as indicia that the Founders wanted the
Legislature to be co-equal, or in many ways superior, to the
Executive in the foreign affairs realm. Simply, they are missing the
point. The legislatures, the Continental Congress together with the
state legislatures, for the most part were functioning as the executive
branch during this period. There was really no executive branch in
existence. Thus, prior to the Constitution, the executive powers in
89. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFRAIR (1990).
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foreign affairs were clearly vested in the legislatures. Even the great
Chief Justice John Marshall later described, "The confederation
was, essentially, a league; and congress was a corps of ambassadors
to be recalled at the will of their masters."90 However, the failures
of this framework led the leading thinkers of the day to reject this
notion and create an executive branch for the roles of both
Commander in Chief and the director of all foreign affairs. The
Constitution, as enacted, rejected the theories that the United
States could function efficiently without an Executive.
Scholars often look to Alexander Hamilton for guidance in
this area. He is well-known to have sought an aggressive executive
branch to meet the needs of foreign affairs and warfare. However,
as Professor Michael Ramsey has noted, even the liberal champion,
Thomas Jefferson, saw the need to have an energetic Executive.
Jefferson stated, "[The Constitution] has declared the Executive
powers shall be vested in the President .... The transaction of
business with foreign nations is Executive altogether. It belongs,
then, to the head of that department, except as to such portions of
it as are specially submitted to the Senate."9 Although not a framer
per se, it is important to note a leading anti-federalist of the period
of the nascent United States also agreed with this notion-thus
helping better argue and articulate the original meaning and
intent of the Framers during this period. It is logical to extend the
assertion that, if Hamilton and Jefferson (arch enemies politically,
socially, and personally) agreed on this-it was reasonably
understood to be the intent of the Framers.
The Framers also looked long and hard at certain state
governments during the revolutionary period to discern how best
to create a strong Executive. New York was the state Hamilton and
the others were influenced by and relied upon most in drafting the
Constitution. Governor Clinton maintained a strong Executive
throughout the 177 0s and 1780s. It was looked upon as the most
stable colony during this era. Of importance, the New York
Constitution, adopted in 1777, vested the Governor with the
position of "general and Commander in Chief of all the militia, and
90. John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution (July 9, 1819), reprinted in 21
STAN. L. REv. 456, 488 (1969).
91. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Question Whether the Senate has the Right to
Negative the Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to Fill Foreign Missions (April 24,
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admiral of the navy of [the] State."'02  Clinton exercised his
unilateral and unitary power by sending the troops to reinforce
General Gates's efforts against the British. He let the legislature
know of his actions at a later date. The strength of the New York
Constitution and government strongly influenced New Hampshire,
Connecticut, and Massachusetts when they created their own state
constitutions as well.
The Framers took the New York example to heart when
drafting the Federal Constitution in Philadelphia. They created an
independent, unitary executive empowered with strong war
powers-certainly including the area of foreign affairs. They were
also strongly influenced by the enlightened thinkers of the day.
Although popular culture often refers to Locke as the most
influential, in reality, Montesquieu and Blackstone were by far the
most widely-read and influential political writers in America during
the Founding period. Madison described Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England as "a book which is in every
man's hand" and described Montesquieu as "[t]he oracle who is
always consulted and cited on the subject" of separation of93
powers. Both Blackstone and Montesquieu defined the executive
powers to include foreign affairs. This area of foreign affairs, and
most importantly carrying out warfare operations, was vested in the
Executive to ensure speed, flexibility, and dispatch.
For example, Montesquieu wrote, "[The Executive] makes
peace or war, sends or receives embassies, establishes the public
security, and provides against invasions. 94  In military affairs,
Montesquieu argued that the Executive should possess exclusive
control over the army. He wrote, "[o] nce an army is established, it
ought not to depend immediately on the legislative, but on the
executive power; and this from the very nature of the thing, its
business consisting more in action than in deliberation. ,9 Again,
the Legislature retained the power of the purse as it does today and
the ability to terminate the authorization of the army. In the days
of the standing army this was significant and could be analogized
today to authorizations to conduct military operations.
92. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XVIII.
93. 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
1382 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 267 (James
Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS (2002).
94. BARON MONTESQUIEU, 1 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 162-63 (Thomas Nugent
trans., 1914) (1748).
95. Id. at 173.
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Similarly, Blackstone in his Commentaries on the Laws of England
declared the conduct of foreign affairs as a quintessentially
executive function. He defended the Crown's authority in this area
by declaring, "the king has also the sole prerogative of making war
and peace .... It would indeed be extremely improper, that any
number of subjects should have the power of binding the supreme
magistrate, and putting him against his will in a state of war.,96
Certainly appropriate guidance for our nation today as we continue
to fight al Qaeda in Iraq as part of the U.S. surge. He further
declared the King to be the "generalissimo, or the first in military
command, within the kingdom."97
These offer glimpses into the most influential thinkers of the
era and give us a real concept of the thinking of our Founding
Fathers as they debated how to create the executive branch.
Additionally, executive power needs to be viewed from a
functional perspective. George Washington, as the nation's first
President, clearly understood his role as Chief Executive. Having
overseen the entire Convention, upon taking office he immediately
assumed the duties of Commander in Chief and leader in foreign
affairs. Without any statutory authority, he exercised the foreign
affairs functions that were not specifically mentioned in the
Constitution-things like control and removal of diplomats,
foreign communications, and formation of foreign policy. These
were powers all previously exercised by the Congress during the
Articles period and the new Congress certainly appeared to
understand these powers had now shifted to the Presidency. Thus,
de facto, it appears understood by the new government, the
authority for foreign affairs-and warfare-had become the sole
province of the Executive. Washington himself established this
precedent.
Hamilton, addressing Washington's Proclamation of
Neutrality, noted this was simply part of the traditional executive
power over foreign affairs-not granted to any other branch of
government-vested in Article II, Section 1.98 His arguments, as we
well know, carried the day. But it should be made clear these were
not isolated proclamations by the genius Hamilton-other
prominent leaders of the 1790s, including Madison, Jay, Ellsworth,
96. WILLJA BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *257.
97. Id. at *262.
98. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in XV THE
PAPERS OFALEXANDER HAMILTON 33 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969).
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John Marshall and President Washington, similarly described
foreign affairs powers as executive in nature.
Thus, the extreme of foreign affairs, warfare operations, were
clearly intended to be embodied within the executive branch.
Once warfare begins, there is little room for having debate on
issues of life and death for our men, and now women, in the armed
forces. Blackstone, Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers,
affirmations by the leaders of the day, as well as the conduct of the
first President himself leaves little room to doubt the Founders'
intentions in this arena. Again, this is not to say Congress has no
role whatsoever. That is not the case. They have the power to
declare war, and during combat operations, the right to refuse to
fund the operations. However, interfering with ongoing battles
and setting timetables for the Commander in Chief do not appear
grounded in the intentions of the Framers, and we would assert,
most of the public today agrees. Interestingly, the grounding of
the strength of the Executive occurred well before we limited the
term of a President to a maximum of eight years. Thus, again, any
sense of an imperial presidency, or other references to tyrannical
government appear hyperbolic.
The President is the Commander in Chief-whether
Democrat, Republican, or Green party. The need for quick action
in this arena requires a unitary response, not the deliberative
bodies of the government opining on what and how to conduct
warfare.
VI. AT WHAT POINT WOULD A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK ON IRAN BE
CONSISTENT WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A. Stephen Wadeck
Of all of the ten questions, this is the one I am perhaps the
least qualified to answer. Assuming that international law would
only authorize a "preemptive" attack on Iran as an exercise of "self-
defense" (and I recognize that there are some scholars who do not
believe that international law even authorizes that much),99 my own
view is that preemption would only be legal as a last resort-at the
99. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of
the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 525, 526 (2006) (suggesting
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point at which an attack on the United States (whether with
conventional or nuclear weapons) seems imminent-not just
likely-and there are no other possible remedies for avoiding such
a conflict. Admittedly, this is a relatively loose standard, and would
depend upon information to which only the national security
apparatus would have access.
Fortunately, I think the significance of this question has been
heavily undermined by the November 2007 National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran, which concluded that Iran halted its nuclear
weapons program in 2003, and has not attempted to restart it
since.100  Although one could imagine a scenario wherein the
United States might engage in preemptive self-defense to prevent
an attack with conventional weapons, my own view is that the
absence of a nuclear threat should militate against preemption in
most cases.
B. Tung Yin
A 2007 U.S. intelligence report concluding that Iran had
ceased work on its nuclear weapons program back in 2003 suggests
that the answer to this question is, "Not now."10' The rule from
international law is easily stated: preemptive military action can be
justified as self-defense if the need is "instant, overwhelming, and
leav[es] no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.'0 °
However, this standard is increasingly difficult to apply in the
modern world of nuclear weapons, where the difference between
capacity to inflict catastrophic damage and infliction of
catastrophic damage may be minutes.
It may be a tempting, therefore, to argue that the United
States should be entitled to use military force to prevent a nation it
100. See Mark Mazzetd, U.S. Says Iran Ended Atomic Wor*, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2007, at Al.
101. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, IRAN: NUCLEAR INTENTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES (Nov. 2007), http://www.iht.com/pdfs/america/20071203-
release.pdf. But see Gregory E. Maggs, How the United States Might Justify a Preemptive
Strike on a Rogue Nation's Nuclear Weapon Development Facilities Under the U.N. Charter,
57 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465, 466 (2007) (arguing that Iran is "engaging in
conventional armed attacks" against the U.S. and its allies, justifying use of military
force in self-defense).
102. This is the famous Caroline rule, as stated in Letter from Daniel Webster,
Secretary of State, to Lord Ashburton (Aug. 6, 1842), reprinted in 2 JOHN BASSETT
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perceives as "rogue" (such as Iran) to prevent it from successfully
developing nuclear weapons. However, if we delve a little more
deeply into matters, we might note that possession of a nuclear
device is not synonymous with the capability of using such a device
against another country, for the nuclear device still has to be
delivered to the target. As of this writing, Iran does not possess a
delivery vehicle capable of reaching the United States. Presumably,
any intercontinental ballistic delivery system would have to be
tested, and such tests could not escape international notice.' 3
In short, I think that we are presently far from being able to
justify a preemptive strike on Iran under current international
law.
C. Amos Guiora
Existing international law does not provide sufficiently clear
guidelines to state decision makers regarding when to takeS 105 • • 106
preemptive or anticipatory action. The Caroline doctrine and
103. There may be a non-trivial possibility that Iran would work with terrorist
groups such as Hezbollah to smuggle a portable nuclear device into the United
States, but this would almost certainly be a radiological (i.e., "dirty") bomb, rather
than an atomic device. In any event, I think it would be difficult to argue that such
possibility triggers the anticipatory self-defense doctrine.
104. Whether international law continues to regulate the conduct of nations in
today's world is a different matter that I leave open for another time.
105. Preemptive self-defense allows for reaction when a serious threat to
national security exists. This interpretation expands the notion of imminence.
This articulation of self-defense was adopted in THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES 1316 (2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. For additional discussion, see CHRISTINE
GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND THE USE OF FORCE 133 (2d ed. 2004); W. Michael
Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-
Defense, 100 AM.J. INT'L L. 525 (2006); Abraham D. Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-
emption, 14 EUR.J. INT'L L. 209 (2003);John Yoo, International Law and the War in
Iraq, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 563 (2003); Michael Glennon, Preempting Terrorism: The Case
for Anticipatoy Self-Defense, WKLY. STANDARD,Jan. 28, 2002, at 24.
106. Anticipatory self-defense allows for reaction when an attack is imminent.
The U.N. Security Council supports this interpretation of self-defense. High-level
Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility, 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/ report.pdf; see also D.W. BOWETr, SELF-DEFENSE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18889 (Frederick A. Praeger 1958); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL LAw IN A DIVIDED WORLD 230-36 (1986); YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENCE 182 (2d ed. 1994); RICHARD ERcKsON, LEGITIMATE
USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 100-
103 (Air University Press 1989); Jutta Brunneee & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of
Force: International Law After Iraq, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 785 (2004); Oscar
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U.N. Article 51 are insufficient in determining when the nation
may act preemptively.
While international law grants states the right to protect
themselves, the question is when that right becomes "operational."
That is, does the state have to await attack or can it act on the basis
of intelligence? The answer is that preemptive action is lawful,
provided the actor has cause to act. How "cause" is defined is critical
to the discussion. If cause is to be loosely defined, then the state is
liable to act in a paradigm best described as "literally unlimited."
Customary international law permits a state to respond to a
threat and infringe on the territorial sovereignty of another nation
when four criteria are met: 1) it is acting in self defense; 2) the
attack is substantial and military (i.e., not an "isolated armed
incident"); 3) the offending nation is complicit, unwilling, or
unable to prevent further attacks; 4) the attack is widespread and
imminent. 07 States, in order to adequately defend themselves,
must be able to be proactive rather than acting solely responsively.
In other words, the State must have the right to act preemptively.
The question that must be answered-both from a legal and a
policy perspective-is what tools determine whether the window of
opportunity regarding Iran's nuclear weapons program is "about to
close." Active self-defense would appear to be the most effective
tool; that is, rather than wait for the actual armed attack to "occur"
(Article 51), the state must be able to act anticipatorily (Caroline).
That, however, begs the question regarding when anticipatory
action is permissible.
The development of a new body of international law providing
legal justification for anticipatory self-defense must be consistent
with existing principles and obligations including proportionality,
military necessity, collateral damage, and exhaustion or
unavailability of a peaceful alternative. The two concepts-active
self-defense and the four fundamental principles listed above-are
not in conflict; rather, they are critical to formulating international
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620 (1984); Ruth
Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALEJ. INT'L. L.
559 (1999).
107. See generally Frank A. Biggio, Neutralizing the Threat: Reconsidering Existing
Doctrines in the Emerging War on Terrorism, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002);
Malvina Halberstam, The U.S. Right to Use Force in Response to the Attacks on the
Pentagon and the World Trade Center, 11 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 851, 852-55
(2004); Elizabeth A. Palmer, Democratic Intervention: U.S. Involvement in Small Wars,
22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 313, 338 (2003).
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law's response to modern "warfare" which is very different from
traditional, previous ones.
While existing international law grants states a fundamental
right to self-defense, the existing limitations do not provide
sufficiently clear guidelines regarding when a state may act. In
other words, there are insufficient actionable guidelines for
modern-day armed conflict.
In the Iranian paradigm, the recommended legal and policy
approach suggests the following model: if decision makers are
convinced that the available intelligence meets a four-part test
(reliable, viable, valid, and corroborated) and economic and
political sanctions have "run their course," then action is
acceptable provided that the four part international law test
(military necessity, collateral damage, proportionality, and
alternatives) is met. Thus, if decision makers have reached the
conclusion based on available intelligence information that the
window of opportunity is "about to close" and that all non-military
means have been exhausted, then a military strike is legally
justifiable according to international law.
D. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Iran in the 21st century offers a glimpse of why, and how, the
accepted norms and rules for self-defense have changed. Again,
this is something the next President and her national security team
will have to be prepared to answer with clarity on the afternoon of
January 20, 2009-if not sooner.
The current situation is extremely dangerous. Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad is an irrational state actor in an unstable nation,
actively in pursuit of nuclear weapons, operating within an already
volatile region. The jus ad bellum issues surrounding any invasion of
Iran are numerous and display the inadequacies and antiquities of
the Caroline doctrine. Striking Iran, and still complying with
international law, would be a difficult task. Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter still provides the authority to respond to actions against the
United States or her interests. But as technology has increased,
and the ability to strike on a moment's notice has become almost
widespread, the lawful ability to respond to potential attacks has
indeed shifted. But at what point is such action acceptable and in
accordance with international law?
There are generally two camps-one in favor of preemptive
attacks and one against such action viewing it as a violation of
50512008]
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international law. A third way, offered by Professor Yoram
Dinstein, seems the best path to follow. Interceptive self-defense
seems the best means to approach the Iran situation. Thus, the
United States should not wait until "the missiles are on the
launching pads" before reacting to any threat from Iran. On the
other hand, the United States should also not attack when there is
no clear intent of imminency.
Thus, under international law and applying Professor
Dinstein's model, we could only strike Iran when there is clear
intent of action against the United States, her allies, or interests.
Indicia of such clear intent would be: mobilization; intercepts of
communications regarding air strikes or intent of attack; repeated
violations of U.N. sanctions and the creation of nuclear weaponry;
violations of the territorial sovereignty of nations within the region;
attacks on nations within the region; or simply overt attacks on U.S.
interests overseas such as firing upon U.S. vessels, kidnapping of
U.S. service members, murders of U.S. citizens, or attacks on the
Embassy. Although not nearly all inclusive, this provides (in this
short space), some clear actions upon which the United States
could strike at Iran without violating international law.
VII. WHAT ADDITIONAL CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO BRING FISA
INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY?
A. Stephen Wadeck
The debate over the need to "modernize" the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has been greatly aided by a
white paper prepared by David Kris, 1 8 who supervised the
government's use of FISA as Associate Deputy Attorney General
from 2000 to 2003. The crux of Kris's argument for modernization
focuses on technological innovations since the statute was written
in 1978, and the increasing anachronism of statutory distinctions
based upon physical location. His paper bears reading in full, and
I wouldn't dare try to encapsulate his recommendations in the
limited space provided here.
On the whole, I can't say that I disagree with Kris's analysis.
108. See David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Joint
Project of the Brookings Institution, the Georgetown University Law Center, and
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Starting from the assumption that FISA as enacted was
constitutional; modernizing FISA should be based upon adapting its
underlying principles to current technology. My only hesitation,
and one to which Kris alludes in his paper but does not fully
explore, is whether the physical distinctions that Kris would largely
eliminate in order to keep up with technology are of constitutional
significance. If one believes, as I do, that there are any number of
applications through which FISA brushes up against (and perhaps
even violates) the Fourth Amendment, then even the most prudent
and expedient revisions to the statute must be carefully scrutinized,
lest the drift toward increasing flexibility weaken fundamental and
well-established constitutional constraints.
Take the "significant purpose" debate, for example. As has
been explained in detail elsewhere, prior to September 11, FISA
had been interpreted to authorize FISA warrants only where the
"primary purpose" of the investigation was to gather foreign
intelligence information. 0 9 In section 218 of the USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001," ° Congress substantially relaxed that requirement,
providing that the government need only show that the gathering
of foreign intelligence information is a "significant purpose" of the
investigation. But there is at least some argument that the "primary
purpose" requirement is constitutionally grounded, a question on
which lower courts have divided." In other words, there is an
important question whether FISA, as enacted, already authorizes
warrantless surveillance up to the constitutional limit.
The devil, of course, is in the details. My point is not to
suggest any one individual revision that might raise constitutional
concerns, but rather that we must generally be careful, even as we
"modernize" FISA, not to take lightly constitutional debates that
prompted the statute's careful drafting in the first place.
109. See, e.g., Nola K. Breglio, Note, Leaving FISA Behind: The Need To Return to
Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 113 YALE L.J. 179, 186 (2003) ("[T]he
executive should be excused from securing a warrant only when the surveillance is
conducted primarily for foreign intelligence reasons." (quoting United States v.
Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912-13 (4th Cir. 1980) (internal quotation
marks omitted))).
110. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291.
111. Compare, e.g., Mayfield v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1042-43 (D.
Or. 2007) (holding that the "significant purpose" amendment is
unconstitutional), with In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002)
(reaching a contrary conclusion).
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B. Tung Yin
One key issue that needs to be clarified is the extent to which
FISA's surveillance warrant requirement applies to electronic
surveillance conducted purely by computers without any
observation by humans. In other words, is it legal for computer
programs to "prescreen" phone calls and e-mails involving
Americans in the United States, with the overwhelming majority of
such calls and e-mails never examined by human beings? One
could argue that the government complies with the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act'12 (in spirit, if not letter) when it then
seeks a FISA warrant to review those few phone calls and e-mails
identified by the computers as potentially relevant to anti-terrorism
investigations.
C. Amos Guiora
I propose expanding FISA's primary purpose beyond its
current limited focus of issuing wire-tapping warrants. The primary
impetus for the proposal is to minimize operational mistakes
resulting from either faulty intelligence or a misreading of available
intelligence. The essence of the proposal is requiring the executive
branch to submit to the FISA Court intelligence prior to
undertaking a specific counterterrorism operation.
This process results in institutional checks on the Executive.
While the proposal suggests a curtailing of executive power, in
essence it is philosophically akin to the FISA Court's issuance of a
wire-tapping warrant in response to an executive-branch request.
The proposed model suggests expanding the FISA Court's purview
to reviewing intelligence information relevant to operational
counterterrorism. However, a recommended standard for
analyzing the reliability and sufficiency of the information is
dependent on the adoption of a modified version of the "right to
confront."
Such a test seemingly limits the state's right to self-defense. In
essence what is suggested is a balancing test. The balancing would
enable the state to act operationally earlier than today, but only after
subjecting the intelligence information to strict scrutiny by the
FISA Court.
Unlike the criminal law paradigm which is comprised of
112. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
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"checks and balances," operational counterterrorism predicated on
intelligence information presently is not subject to institutionalized
criteria or independent analysis. The proposed "strict scrutiny"
standard reflects a balanced approach regarding operational
counterterrorism: act earlier but with greater certainty.
The logistics of this proposal are far less daunting than they
initially appear. The court before whom the Executive would
submit the evidence is the FISA Court."' Presently, FISA Court
judges weigh the reliability of intelligence information in
determining whether to grant government ex parte requests for
wire-tapping warrants. While this is admittedly an imperfect
solution, the proposal establishes judicial approval prior to the
Executive's undertaking a counterterrorism operation predicated
solely on intelligence information.
The standard the court would adopt in determining the
information's reliability is the same applied in the traditional
criminal law paradigm. The intelligence must be reliable, material,
and probative. While the model is different-a defense attorney
cannot question state witnesses-the court will assume a dual role.
In this dual role capacity, the court will examine (actually, in theory
cross-examine) the representative of the intelligence community
and subsequently rule as to the information's admissibility.
While some may suggest that the FISA Court is largely an
exercise in "rubber-stamp[ing],' 14 the proposal's purpose is to
require the government to present the available information to an
independent judiciary as a precursor to engaging in operational
counterterrorism. In ruling on the information's "admissibility,"
the court would be authorized to order the government to provide
additional intelligence prior to "signing off' on the request.
113. Id. §§ 1801-1829. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, created
under FISA, is composed of seven federal district court judges from across the
United States; the judges are appointed by the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court.
See Anne Bell, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, THE ONLINE NEWSHOUR, PBS, Mar. 1,
2006, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth-coverage/terrorism/homeland/
fisa.html.
114. SeeJoshua L. Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy
and Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS
J. 81, 95 (2003); James E. Meason, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Time for
Reappraisal, 24 INT'L LAW. 1043, 1052 (1990).
115. How much intelligence and what intelligence will be "enough"? This
question was considered, but the answer is that the exact amount is
unquantifiable. This paper does not propose to quantify the amount of
intelligence that will be enough for the FISA court to sign off on, because there is
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Though the proposal explicitly calls for changing the nature of
the relationship between the executive and the judicial branches of
the government, it would serve to minimize intelligence-based
mistakes in operational counterterrorism. Is the court's decision
enforceable? Can the Executive ignore the FISA Court's ruling?
To ensure enforcement, a President that acts in contravention to
the FISA Court's ruling could be liable for committing a crime-
and possibly an impeachable offense.
D. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) was drafted
in 1978. It is clearly outdated. As this is being written, Congress is
embroiled in a debate about the temporary legislation known as
the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) enacted in Augustjust prior
to the summer recess. The intention of the legislation, strongly
and emotionally pleaded for by leading members of the
intelligence community, including Mike McConnell, was to update
FISA to meet gaps and loopholes contained within the original
legislation drafted in 1978. Unfortunately, as the House has taken
up a review of the temporary legislation, politics is rearing its ugly
head into the arena of national security.
While the PAA has only been in effect for three months, it has
permitted the United States to temporarily close an intelligence
gap by enabling intelligence professionals to collect, without a
court order, foreign intelligence on targets located overseas. These
are known as so called "foreign to foreign contacts." The collection
in question has no impact on the U.S. citizen or her constitutional
rights. This legislation is focused on the foreign to foreign
communications only. The technology of cell phones, computers,
the internet, and other such means of communication were not
(and could not have been) in the minds of the drafters of the
original FISA back in the late 1970s. The internationalization of
technology now often requires such communications to be
"routed" through a site located here in the United States. Thus,
this was creating many issues and exposing the United States to not
being able to obtain all the information necessary to protect the
United States. The PAA of 2007 helped remedy this confusion.
Unless reauthorized by Congress, however, the authority provided
in the PAA will expire February 2008. Thus, Congress needs to
no practical answer to that question.
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avoid bickering and politics, and rise above partisanship to do
three things with the current legislation before them: 1) make the
PAA permanent; 2) provide protection from private lawsuits against
companies alleged to have assisted the government in the
aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the homeland; and 3)
ensure U.S. citizens constitutional rights are maintained.
Unfortunately, the current version of the House legislation,
although proactively updating some of the foreign intelligence
collection laws, accomplishes none of the three key requirements
listed above. Therefore, there needs to be greater debate on this
issue within both Chambers attentive to the national security
ramifications of not updating FISA-particularly in making the
legislation permanent and in supporting those companies who
acted in "good faith" in responding to needs of the United States
and its demands immediately following 9/11. FISA and PAA, in the
war on al Qaeda, are critical tools in waging this armed conflict.
Without question, they are more important now than in the past.
Such foreign intelligence gathering is actually a "tactic" in fighting
al Qaeda and its network. The al Qaeda warrior is not from one
country, but roughly fifty different nations, wears no uniform, and
flouts the laws of war. Al Qaeda are hybrid warriors-part
international criminal and part jihadist. Thus, in the current
armed conflict, reliance on intelligence and detection of cells
before they become operational is more important than in past
conflicts. The ability to prevent attacks on the United States is
directly linked to providing the tools necessary to our intelligence
professionals operating overseas.
Updating FISA should also include the creation of permanent
judges for FISA courts. Judges learned in the niche practice of
intelligence law, military law, and the law of armed conflict need to
be making decisions on FISA applications and appeals. The war we
are engaged in is dependent on strong intelligence operations and
the need for judges to be specialists in this area will become of
greater importance for the foreseeable future. This is a war, and
judges only versed in traditional law enforcement regimes and
requirements are likely to be overly restrictive when applying
requests for intercepts when the nation is on a wartime footing.
Creating a special court with special judges will help FISA
modernize and be more of an effective national security tool than
currently exists.
Modernizing FISA is not a political issue; it is a national
2008] 5057
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security issue. Although even we disagree on some elements of the
PAA, both sides need to work together to provide the tools
necessary for the government to conduct these operations while
still ensuring U.S. citizens' constitutional rights and human rights
are maintained.
VIII. SHOULD CONGRESS PASS A STATUTE THAT, BY ACTING AS A
SHIELD FROM SUBPOENAS, WOULD ALLOWJOURNALISTS TO PROTECT
THEIR SOURCES?
A. Stephen Vladeck
I find myself somewhat conflicted on arguments for a federal
journalist shield law. I generally support proposals for such a
measure, albeit with some important caveats. Every state, except
Hawaii and Wyoming, either has a shield law or recognizes a
common law privilege for reporters against disclosing the identity
of confidential sources. And there are incredibly strong policy
reasons to support a similar shield for reporters from federal
subpoenas, lest confidential sources lose faith in the ability of
reporters to protect their identity.
One argument that is often raised in response is that a federal
shield law would jeopardize national security, as it would make it
that much harder for the government to investigate (and
successfully prosecute) those who illegally leak classified national
security information. Thus, whatever interest the public has in a
press capable of protecting confidential sources, that interest is
easily outweighed by the government's interest in keeping its
secrets secret.
My own view is that this concern is mostly overblown. Federal
shield proposals such as the Free Flow of Information Act of 2007
contain exceptions where the reporter is an eyewitness to, or
participant in, a crime; or if there is an imminent threat to life or
national security.116 In the context of classified national security
information, both exceptions are present.
First, it will not take much convincing to conclude that the
disclosure of classified national security information creates an
imminent threat to national security. Second, and more
importantly, the Espionage Act of 1917 (along with a host of other
116. S. 2035, 110th Cong. §§ 3,5 (2007).
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statutes surveyed in substantial detail elsewhere), proscribes the
disclosure of classified national security information to anyone "not
entitled to receive it.""' 7  Thus, whether or not the reporter is
violating the Espionage Act by receiving such classified
information, the reporter is, at a minimum, witnessing a crime-
the disclosure by the government official.
In short, so long as such a law took account of those cases
where I would be less inclined to allow reporters to protect the
identity of their confidential sources, then I think Congress should
enact a federal journalist shield law.
B. Tung Yin
As a threshold matter, the question does not indicate whether
the shield would be absolute or qualified; by qualified, I mean that
the privilege could be overcome in certain circumstances. Since
the currently-proposed shield laws are qualified, I shall confine my
discussion accordingly. I will note that an absolute shield would be
very difficult to justify, for it would create, as the Supreme Court
noted, "a system that would be unaccountable to the public, would
pose a threat to the citizen's justifiable expectations of privacy, and
would equally protect well-intentioned informants and those who
for pay or otherwise betray their trust to their employer or
associates.""8
On the other hand, the Valerie Plame scandal, in which a
former CIA undercover operative had her cover "blown" by a leak
to political journalist Robert Novak, suggests that even the mass
media itself is not of unanimous thought about the desirability of a
shield law. At the beginning of the disclosure of Plame's identity,
the mainstream press fully supported the idea of a government
investigation into the leak. It was only when special prosecutor
Patrick Fitzgerald subpoenaed reporters Judith Miller and Matt
Cooper to reveal their sources, that the press began to have second
thoughts.19
The basic argument for some sort of shield law makes sense to
me: journalists are in the business of gathering information and
117. See generally Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes
and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1973) (surveying the
statutory framework of the Act).
118. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972).
119. Perhaps the mainstream press relished the thought of a government
investigation of Novak, a conservative journalist and columnist.
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disseminating that information; sometimes the information is in
the hands of a person who does not want to be identified as the
source of the news story; and thus, absent some ability to assure the
source that the reporter will not cavalierly "burn" him or her, the
information may remain hidden from the public. Many states have
been persuaded to adopt their own shield laws that require the
party seeking to pierce the privilege to demonstrate that alternative
avenues of seeking the information have failed and that the
information protected by the privilege is important to the litigation
at hand.
Still, I wonder how effective a qualified shield law can be.
While it would express a norm of protecting journalists from being
forced to disclose their sources-itself a valuable
accomplishment-I would expect intense litigation in high-profile
or sensitive cases, and it is quite possible that "national security"
would often, if not nearly always, serve as a trump card to overcome
the privilege."2
C. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Congress should not, in matters of national security, legislate a
shield from subpoenas. The protection of sources is of primary
concern in day-to-day operations but the balance necessarily shifts
toward the government in times of armed conflict or in areas
dealing with national security. To do otherwise seems absurd. As
Judge Posner has said, adherence to the Constitution is not a
suicide pact. 12  Matters of national security must always be
distinguished from traditional law enforcement or other matters.
Thus, although ingrained in our socio-political culture to promote
freedom of the press as a means to check against the abuses of
government, the negative effects of those who leak sensitive
information, particularly if such laws are enacted, would severely
120. Some would argue that the "state secrets doctrine" has metastasized into a
similar kind of "the government always wins" trump card. See, e.g., Amanda Frost,
The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1931 (2007);
Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix
the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 25,
available at http://works.bepress.com/jeremy-telman/3/). Cf Robert Chesney,
State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249,
1301 (2007) (concluding that the Bush administration has not overused the state
secrets doctrine compared to prior administrations).
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impact the ability of the government to fulfill its core, primary
function: to protect the citizenry.
Having said that, thirty-one states now have a reporter-source
shield laws in effect. The federal government does not.122
Journalists have been called to testify about their sources with
increased frequency. 123 In 2005, Judith Miller spent 85 days in jail
for contempt for refusing to reveal her source in the Valarie Plame
leak investigation; she remained in jail until her source released
her from keeping his identity secret. By the time of publication of
this piece, author James Risen will have decided how to handle a
grand jury subpoena to testify in early February about his source for
material in his book State of War, wherein he details CIA foul-ups
related to its activities towards Iran. 124 A more exhaustive list of
similar attempts to get reporters to reveal their sources would fill
many more pages.
The journalist's choice is between divulging their source,
which will most certainly affect (that is, shut down) future access to
confidential sources, and maintaining confidentiality of the source,
which at worst will help consummate an illegal act for material
unlawfully leaked (as in the leak that provided Risen his material),
potentially landing the reporter in jail for contempt.
The media was exceedingly important to the Founding
Fathers, who saw a free press as the watchdog against a tyrannical
government.1 25 They would have never envisioned the excesses of
the twenty-four hour media coverage of the 21st century. Today,
the media is hailed in some circles for uncovering purported
government excesses in its prosecution of the war on al Qaeda.
However, it is now clear that some of the published information
came from a source who unlawfully leaked it. This sets the stage
for a worst case scenario: is the decision for an informant to leak
information contrary to the law; the decision for a reporter to write
122. Anastasia Heeger, Securing a Journalist's Testimonial Privilege in the
International Criminal Court, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 209, 230 (2005).
123. Leslie Siegel Trampling on the Fourth Estate: The Need for a Federal Reporter
Shield Law Providing Absolute Protection Against Compelled Disclosure of News Sources and
Information, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (2006).
124. Philip Shenon, Times Reporter Subpoenaed Over Source for Book, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, at Al7.
125. An often cited example is Thomas Jefferson's statement, "If it were left to
me to decide whether we should have a government without a free press or a free
press without a government, I would prefer the latter." Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprinted in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMASJEFFERSON 57 (Andrew Lipscomb et al. eds., 1905).
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on it; and the inability for a government to figure out any other way
to seal the leak. Ultimately, it comes down to self-censorship.
Although necessary in some areas, a shield law should not be
enacted to protect media sources in national security cases. The
status quo is the best balance to ensure a free press that does not
trump the homeland's security.
IX. DOES THE JOSE PADILLA CASE PROVE THAT THE CIVILIAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM CAN EFFECTIVELY HANDLE TERRORISM CASES?
A. Stephen Wadeck
As subjectively biased as my answers to the other questions may
be, my answer to this question is objectively biased, given that I
worked on the Padilla litigation at various points. That being said,
I'm not sure Padilla is all that helpful either in proving that the
civilian criminal justice system can effectively handle "terrorism"
cases, or, perhaps more importandy, that it cannot. On the one
hand, the government obtained a conviction against one of the
higher-profile terrorism suspects arrested since September 11. And
assuming the sentence stands on appeal, it will be well over a
decade before Padilla goes free.
On the other hand, the crimes for which he was indicted and
convicted pale in comparison to the plots in which the government
claims he participated. One of three things is true: either the
government had evidence connecting Padilla to the more serious
allegations, but could not use it because it was 1) too sensitive; 2)
inadmissible; or 3) it did not have such evidence. We just can't
know the answer to that question, but I'm bothered much more by
1) than I am by 2) or 3). Rules precluding the admission of coerced
or hearsay testimony exist for a reason-such testimony tends to be
unreliable. And so the only real reason why Padilla might prove that
the civilian criminal justice system can't handle these cases is if the
most serious evidence in the government's possession was too
sensitive to be disclosed to the jury. To me, though, that possibility
is not enough to justify calls for departing from the traditional
civilian criminal process.
The harder issue raised by the Padilla case is the government's
midstream change-in-tactics from military detention to civilian
criminal prosecution, and the concomitant question of whether
Padilla should (and will) ever have an opportunity to meaningfully
[Vol. 34:55062
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contest the legality of his detention separate from his conviction.
Here, I am in complete agreement with Judge Luttig:
For, as the government surely must understand, although
the various facts it has asserted are not necessarily
inconsistent or without basis, its actions have left not only
the impression that Padilla may have been held for these
years, even if justifiably, by mistake-an impression we
would have thought the government could ill afford to-
leave extant. They have left the impression that the
government may even have come to the belief that the
principle in reliance upon which it has detained Padilla
for this time, that the President possesses the authority to
detain enemy combatants who enter into this country for
the purpose of attacking America and its citizens from
within, can, in the end, yield to expediency with little or
no cost to its conduct of the war against terror-an
impression we would have thought the government
likewise could ill afford to leave extant.1
6
Finally, I think the better test for the civilian criminal justice
system's ability to handle high-profile terrorism cases is the
Moussaoui trial. I recently had the pleasure of helping to organize a
conference on proposals for a new national security court at which
the presiding judge in the Moussaoui trial, the Honorable Leonie
Brinkema, gave the keynote address. Judge Brinkema spoke to her
experience with the case, and her fervent belief that the civilian
judicial system is capable of handling terrorism trials. Her remarks
are available online,'127 and are worth listening to; she's in a far
better position to answer this question than I am.
B. Geoffrey S. Corn
It certainly did not undermine this proposition. Padilla and
other terrorism prosecutions have been effective in not only
adjudicating allegations of terror, but also in rebutting the
assertion that the nature of the contemporary terrorist threat
created a compelling need for the use of military commissions or
that there is an imperative need for a new court devoted to
terrorism or national security related cases. Ironically, the
126. Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 587 (4th Cir. 2005) (mem.).
127. See Remarks of the Hon. Leonie Brinkema at American University





Abrams et al.: Ten Questions on National Security
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
argument for efficiency seems to have been turned on its head as
the result of the effective application of federal criminal law to
alleged terrorists. While cases such as Padilla's do require a
substantial amount of time and resources, the only military
commission case to proceed to judgment was the result of a plea
agreement of questionable credibility (David Hicks did plead guilty
following the resurrection of the military commissions by operation
of the Military Commission Act, 12 but it seemed clear he chose to
forego putting the government to the test only because it provided
him an immediate ticket back to Australia).
The key to this question is the word "effectively." In the
context of terrorism prosecutions, "effectively" must be defined not
only in terms of prosecutorial efficiency, but also in terms of
legitimacy of the process. In this regard, cases like Padilla's
demonstrate that effective terrorist prosecutions can be conducted
without depriving defendants of substantive and procedural rights
historically associated with legitimate criminal process. They also
prove that the complexity of these cases does not necessitate a
specialized tribunal to deal with them.
There are, of course, concerns with relying on the civilian
courts to deal with such cases. One such concern is related to the
legal complexity resulting from the intersection of domestic
criminal and international law. The characterization of the
struggle against transnational terrorism as an "armed conflict"
invariably implicates rights and obligations derived from the laws of
war. The Padilla case, and that of his co-defendant Hassoun, as
with other such cases, raised concerns about whether this
intersection is effectively understood by the civilian judiciary and
can be effectively digested by civilian jurors. However, one clear
advantage of the civilian criminal process is that convicted
defendants have a full opportunity to raise alleged errors on
appeal. Furthermore, as the body of jurisprudence related to these
cases continues to grow, these issues will be extensively vetted and
accordingly better understood by both the federal judiciary and the
attorneys involved.
C. Tung Yin
One case cannot prove that the criminal justice system can
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handle terrorism cases effectively, because it may be the next case
that highlights the critical defects in the system. We should no
more judge the ability of the civilian criminal justice system to
process al Qaeda suspects based on one case than we would judge
the fairness of militar~ tribunals based on one (hypothetically)
successful prosecution.
That said, even if we could judge the criminal justice system
based on one case, I would not think that the Padilla case would be
the one to use. It is questionable what this case actually proves. Is
it that the government is capable of convicting terrorism
defendants in federal court without having the proceedings
degenerate into a spectacle, as happened in the Moussaoui case? Is
it that terrorism defendants can receive a fair trial?
In the end, I am skeptical that the Padilla trial proves much of
anything. It is impossible to know how much the jury was affected,
either directly or subconsciously, by the government's prior claims
that Padilla returned to the United States in May 2002 intending to
build a radiological ("dirty") bomb to explode in a major city. It is
impossible to know how much Padilla's ability to help conduct his
own defense was impaired by his years of detention in a military
brig and the incessant interrogation.
Indeed, to demonstrate further pessimism, I am not even sure
that successful criminal convictions in cases such as the
Lackawanna Six and the Portland Cell necessarily prove that the
civilian criminal justice system can handle terrorism cases
effectively. As I have examined elsewhere, 1' there are reasons to
wonder about the validity of the guilty pleas in those cases.
D. Norman Abrams
Does the "Jose Padilla case" refer to the prosecution, trial, and
conviction of Padilla in the U.S. district court in Florida for
terrorism-related offenses, or does it also include the entire long
sequence of events relating to Padilla, a sequence that I have
elsewhere described as "The Saga of Jose Padilla"?1
3
1
129. Of course, we can judge a system based on one failure, so perhaps the
question should really be asking whether the Zacarias Moussaoui trial proves that
the criminal justice system cannot handle al Qaeda suspects. See A. John Radsan,
The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1417 (2005).
130. See Tung Yin, Coercion and Terrorism Prosecutions in the Shadow of Military
Detention, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1255 (2006).
131. NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTI-TERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT (3d ed.,
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If "case" refers to the Florida prosecution of Padilla, then the
question is directed to the relatively simple issue of whether a
successful civilian criminal prosecution of a person charged with
terrorist offenses demonstrates that the civilian criminal justice
system is adequately equipped to handle terrorism cases. No single
case, not even necessarily a group of successful criminal
prosecutions of this type, can constitute proof that the civilian
criminal justice system can effectively handle terrorism cases.
Indeed, the Padilla prosecution is a poor example to cite in
support of that proposition since: 1) it was based on facts
investigated by the government prior to Padilla's detention as an
enemy combatant; and 2) the case did not include many of the
issues that make civilian criminal terrorism prosecutions difficult
for prosecutors. Compare, for example, the case of United States v.
Moussaoui,3 2 which is a poster case for the difficulty of prosecuting
a terrorism case in a civilian court, because of the special and
unusual classified information issues that arose in that case.
If the original question refers to the entire saga of Padilla,
then answering the question is more complicated. Padilla was
originally arrested as a material witness. He was later declared an
enemy combatant and moved to military custody, and then
detained and interrogated for a very lengthy period. In the
meantime, he sought habeas corpus review; his original lawsuit
went to the Supreme Court which ruled that he had sued the
wrong person in the wrong court. Padilla's attorneys began again.
He won in the district court; the government appealed to the
circuit court of appeals, which ruled in its favor. Padilla then
sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court. Before the Court
could rule on his petition, the government transferred Padilla to
civilian custody and added him as defendant to an indictment in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.
The transfer of Padilla back to civilian custody was widely
interpreted as reflecting the government's concern that it would
lose before the high court. In fact there is a simpler, more likely
explanation for the transfer of Padilla back to civilian custody for
prosecution. If the government had continued to detain Padilla in
military custody, it would have been committed to indefinitely
forthcoming 2008).
132. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005).
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detaining him without prosecution, or releasing him, since military
prosecution was not an option under the existing Presidential
Military Order. Prosecution before a military commission under
the Order was restricted to non-citizens, and Padilla, of course, was
a U.S. citizen.
Moreover, the government's chances before the Supreme
Court looked somewhat better since the court of appeals had
concluded, based on new information submitted by the
government, that Padilla's detention fell within the principle
established in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,"3' namely that he had been in
combatant status on or near the battlefield.
Eventually, if the government wished to prosecute him, it
would necessarily have had to transfer him back to civilian custody.
And the government undoubtedly preferred to take that step
before Supreme Court review of the case rather than after. Why
so? The government had essentially nullified the effect of the
Supreme Court decision in the prior Hamdi decision by settling the
matter and releasing him after it had won the right to continue his
detention. The government should have been concerned by the
Court's distress over the sequence of events in Hamdi. Had it
proceeded with Supreme Court review in Padilla and then afterwards
switched Padilla to civilian custody for prosecution, the Court
might well have reacted strongly. Better to make the transfer
before rather than after Supreme Court review.
To return to the original question, the Padilla case does not
demonstrate that the civilian criminal justice system can effectively
handle terrorism cases. It does, however, highlight the fact that the
present military system for dealing with terrorists makes no
provision for trying persons like Padilla, that is, U.S. citizens
accused of terrorist crimes. And unless alternative processes are to
be developed, whether military or otherwise, the prosecution of
U.S. citizens will necessarily continue to take place in the civilian
criminal justice system-whether or not that system can effectively
handle terrorism cases.
E. Amos Guiora
The trial of Zacarias Moussaoui-held out by some as an
example justifying the effectiveness of Article III courts for
terrorists-highlights the many problems attendant with trying
133. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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suspected terrorists in an Article III court. Moussaoui, often
referred to as "the 20th hijacker," was suspected of training with al
Qaeda in preparation for the 9/11 attacks and later pled guilty to
six counts of conspiracy. While initially denying involvement, he
ultimately confessed that he was supposed to fly a fifth plane into
the White House. Grandstanding throughout the process,
Moussaoui largely turned the trial into a farce. The court-
particularly when Moussaoui chose to represent himself-was
largely unequipped to respond to or prevent his antics, which
significantly affected public perception of the judicial process.
Furthermore, Moussaoui's trial raised Sixth Amendment
compulsory due process concerns. 34  Preparing his defense,
Moussaoui asked for access to "alleged terrorist ringleader Ramzi
bin al-Shibh"135 who, at the time, was in federal custody, because
Moussaoui believed bin al-Shibh could provide exculpatory
evidence. The government, however, argued that giving Moussaoui




The court, however, agreed with Moussaoui, "holding that the
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process is not outweighed
by claims that the government's intelligence-gathering efforts
would be undermined." 7 Moussaoui "would be given access to,
and could present to the jury, a compilation of summaries of
reports of bin A1-Shibh's statements taken by the government. " '"
The court's decision highlights the ongoing conflicts between a
suspected terrorist defendant's rights and the government's
security concerns.
The fundamental deficiencies with using Article III courts in a
terrorist context are inherent. First, much of the evidence available
against suspected terrorists is predicated on intelligence
information. Article III courts, however, must abide by certain
constitutional rights, including the Sixth Amendment right to
confront one's accuser. This right places an explicit limitation on
the prosecution. It deprives the prosecutor of the ability to go
forth with all available (and confidential) intelligence information,
since the defendant would not be able to confront it.
134. See Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference:
Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFsTRA L. REv. 795, 835-37 (2004)
(discussing some of the Sixth Amendment issues raised by the Moussaoui case).
135. Id. at 835.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 835-36.
138. Id. at 837.
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In addition, a defendant in an Article III court has a right to
trial by a 'Jury of his peers." I Put simply: if Osama bin Laden were
detained today and brought before a court of law, would it be
possible to find a 'jury of his peers"? Would it be possible to find
twelve members of the community willing to sit in judgment of the
most wanted terrorist on the planet?
While an instinctual, reflexive, revenge-based answer is "yes,"
closer scrutiny suggests that fears of retribution from bin Laden
supporters would drive the overwhelming majority of potential
jurors literally "underground." Two principal staples of Article III
courts are, in essence, incompatible with terrorism-related trials:
the right to confront one's accusers and trial by a jury of one's
peers.
Others raise similar concerns. For example, Jack Goldsmith
and Neal Katyal suggest that criminal prosecutions are "not always
feasible.' ' 40  For instance, "[s]ome alleged terrorists have not
committed overt crimes and can be tried only on a conspiracy
theory that comes close to criminalizing group membership."
Also, the standard of proof for evidence collected in Afghanistan
"might not meet every jot and tittle of American criminal law.'
42
Goldsmith and Katyal argue that instead, Congress should
"establish a comprehensive system of preventive detention that is
overseen by a national security court composed of federal judges
with life tenure.'
143
Domestic terror courts address the principal issues associated
with Article III courts. By enabling the government to introduce
available intelligence information, domestic terror courts create a
forum for the government to present its case in full. Does this
affect the rights of the defendant? In full candor, the answer is yes.
But, the proposed court will protect the defendant by ensuring that
the court will not automatically accept the introduced intelligence
into the record.
139. See Carter v.Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970) (quoting Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)) (defining "peers" as "'equals of the
person whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine .. . of his neighbors,
fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in society as that which he
holds"').
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That is, the government will have to show that the intelligence
information is valid, viable, relevant, and corroborated. Strict scrutiny
that balances the legitimate rights of the individual with the equally
legitimate national security rights of the state is one of the
significant advantages of the proposed domestic court.
Under my proposal, intelligence information would be
presented in camera by the prosecutor and a representative of the
intelligence services who would be subject to rigorous cross-
examination by the court. The judges who would sit on the
domestic terror court would be trained in understanding
intelligence information. In addition, the bench would be
expected to fulfill a "double role"-that of fact finder and defense
counsel alike. As the latter will be barred from attending the
hearings when intelligence information is submitted, the domestic
terror court would have to proactively engage the prosecutor. The
burden on the court would be enormously significant because the
defendant, who would not be present, would not have counsel
representing him with respect to the submission of intelligence
information into the record.
This is a major stumbling block regarding domestic terror
courts. Based on my experience sitting as a judge in administrative
detention hearings where the only evidence relevant to the
detainee was intelligence information, the burden on the judge is
significant. However, it is the only manner in which intelligence
information can be submitted. In analyzing terrorism-related cases,
it is critical that the role of intelligence information be fully
understood: it is all but impossible to conduct a terrorism-related
case without it.
That is, without making intelligence information available, no
court can fully understand or appreciate the role a particular
defendant has played in a terrorist cell. Without that information,
a court cannot understand the inner workings of a terrorist cell, its
goals, missions, and motivations. Without that information, a court
will be, in essence, groping in the dark.
Some in favor of Article III courts suggest that:
The difficulties involved in using classified evidence in
terrorism prosecutions do not provide compelling support
for an argument that the criminal justice system should be
abandoned in terrorism cases; these difficulties are
entirely self-imposed .... If the government determines
that it is more important to national security that a piece
of information remain secret than to prosecute the
[Vol. 34:55070
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terrorist, it can simply choose not to use that information
or not to charge that terrorist until some unclassified
evidence of his guilt can be presented. If the government
determines that it is more important to national security
to prosecute the terrorist than to keep the information in
question secret-perhaps to prevent him from carrying
out a terrorist attack-it can simply declassify the
information and use it as evidence against him.'"
While this argument is true-the government can choose
whether or not to prosecute a terrorist based on whether they want
to disclose intelligence information or not-it is inherently
limiting. The government is caught in an all-or-nothing situation;
either it keeps intelligence information secret, or it prosecutes
terrorists. This highlights both the importance of intelligence
information (essential in order to try terrorists) and the Article III
courts' inability to properly account for its importance. Domestic
terror courts, on the other hand, allow the government both to
maintain the secrecy of intelligence information and to try
suspected terrorists. As George Washington wrote in 1777:
The necessity of procuring good Intelligence, is apparent
and need not be further urged. All that remains for me to
add is, that you keep the whole matter as secret as
possible. For upon secrecy, success depends in most
Enterprises of the kind, and for want of it, they are
generally defeated, however well planned and promising a
favourable issue.145
F. Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
Jose Padilla and other similar cases, such as the Moussaoui case,
actually highlight the need for a new court system rather thanS• 146
simply continuing to jam a square peg in a round hole. At first
144. Michael German, Tiying Enemy Combatants in Civilian Courts, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1421, 1426-27 (2007).
145. Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA.
L. REV. 811, 811 (2007) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Col. Elias
Dayton (July 26, 1777), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE
ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES, 1745-1799, at 479 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
146. Recent events further demonstrate the limitations of using the civilian
courts by accused international terrorists. Padilla sued various members of the
U.S. Government for memoranda drafted and legal advice given. See Adam
Litptak, Padilla Sues Former U.S. Lawyer Over Detention, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 5, 2008, at A9
(reporting that Padilla is filing suit against John Yoo, author of the so-called
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glance, some see the benefit of the using the existing Article III
federal court system without the need for an additional court.
Clearly, if possible and practicable, this would be the best case
scenario. However, there are many concerns with simply using the
civilian system (analogously, the purely military system did not, and
cannot function in the current environment).
Examples of problems associated with using the existing system
include: 1) obtaining unbiased juries to hear a given international
terror case-regardless of venue; 2) evidentiary concerns from
those captured on the battlefield in Afghanistan; 3) Fourth and
Fifth Amendment issues associated with the exclusionary rule-
unlikely warrants will be issued overseas, or in a battle zone; 4) the
introduction of classified material; 5) clearance issues for myriad
defense counsel; 6) the inadvertent disclosure of classified
evidence-including the names of nations working alongside the
United States to capture or fight al Qaeda; 7) concerns over the
right to pro se counsel as evidenced in the Moussaoui case; 8)
application of the Brady rule and providing exculpatory evidence;
9) courts being used as propaganda tools for al Qaeda (their
training manuals tell them to do just that); 10) potential for ten
federal cases being tried in ten different circuits and the
inconsistencies stemming from such otherwise normal use of the
courts; 11) the "slippery slope" of accommodating or relaxing
certain rules in the federal courts could begin to "bleed" over into
other standard criminal practices (bad for the overall U.S. justice
system); 12) the documented need for additional and lifelong
judge protective details during and after hearing a case; and 13)
many existing federal judges need enormous training to gain
knowledge of intelligence law and operations as well as military law.
Interestingly, both the Moussaoui and Padilla cases were, and are
still being, used as propaganda tools for al Qaeda. Although their
current litigation is clearly frivolous and will be thrown out of
court, the propaganda victory of such actions against members of
the U.S. Government cannot be overstated.
Again, these (and other potential) weaknesses of using the
.torture memo"). Moussaoui, a French citizen who plead guilty and is serving
time, now claims his constitutional rights were violated. See Adam Litpak, The Right
to Counsel, in the Right Situations, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 26, 2008, at All (discussing
Moussaoui's claim that his right to counsel was violated when the trial court ruled
he must have a lawyer with security clearance and limited the information that
attorney could pass to Moussaoui).
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federal system highlight the need for a new specialized court system
dedicated to national security purposes.
X. WHAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE IN NATIONAL SECURITY LAW
TODAY?
A. Stephen Wadeck
To me, the most important issue in national security law today
is the question of where we go from here. Regardless of what
happens this coming November, the Twentieth and Twenty-Second
Amendments together guarantee that, at 12:01 p.m. on Tuesday,
January 20, 2009, there will be a new President. For better or for
worse, that President will have his or her own ideas about how best
to simultaneously protect national security and civil liberties, and
will have our collective experience with the past seven years to
build on, however good or bad that experience happens to have
been.
With that in mind, there is an assumption that pervades much
of the writing (and even more of the public discourse) relating to
national security law today-that the balance between national
security and civil liberties inevitably reduces to a zero sum game,
and the only difference between our national leaders (and our
political parties) is where they would place the fulcrum of the scale.
As a result, all national security policy initiatives are seemingly cast
in binary political-and partisan-terms. Those who support a
measure to strengthen our security must not care about individual
rights. Those who oppose it must be weak, and must not have the
best interests of the United States at heart.
My own suspicion is that, especially in the area of national
security law, this divisiveness is dangerously counterproductive and
stands in the way of genuine, principled reform. Reasonable
people can and should disagree about the best way to protect the
country from all threats, man-made or natural, foreign or domestic.
But my fear is that, under current conditions, neither side thinks
the other has anything useful to add to the conversation. So as we
look to the future and to the "most important issue" in national
security law today, I think the answer is figuring out how we move
forward together in protecting both the security of the nation and
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the freedoms that make securing the nation worthwhile. 47 And
whether or not "war is too serious a business to be left to the
generals," I have little doubt that national security is too serious a
business to be left to partisan politics.
B. Geoffrey S. Corn
The most important issue in national security law today is the
relationship between national security law and national security
policy. U.S. national security policy will succeed only if policy is
responsive to law, and not vice versa. To paraphrase Justice
Frankfurter from the Steel Seizure case, the existence of emergency
does not, ipso facto, produce power in government; and power in
the federal government to respond to emergency does not, ipso14
facto, produce power in the executive branch. However, most
observers would now agree that this was exactly the philosophy that
dominated executive-branch decision making in the aftermath of
the terror attacks of September 11.
This distorted view of the role of law in the development and
execution of national security policy was pervasive at the highest
levels of the executive branch. With issues ranging from the legal
basis for Operation Iraqi Freedom, to the status and treatment of
individuals captured by the armed forces during the military
component of the self-proclaimed Global War on Terror, to the
development of a process for the use of military commissions, to
the use of national intelligence assets to conduct domestic
surveillance, law had become a slave to policy. This not only
undermined the legitimacy of these critical national security policy
decisions-a number of which were subsequently invalidated
because of defective legal foundations-but it damaged morale of
the thousands of legal advisors serving throughout the executive
branch. These lawyers-some relatively inexperienced, others with
long and distinguished careers in government service-had always
understood their ultimate role to be that of ensuring the
policymakers they advised adjusted their decisions to the dictates of
law. However, the message sent through the dubious legal
opinions emanating from the senior levels of the executive branch
undermined this fundamental tenet of ethical responsibility and
147. See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
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suggested that the "new" role of legal advisors was to interpret law
in a way that accommodated policy objectives.
This is not to suggest that legal advisors should pride
themselves on being "naysayers." Indeed, the tradition of the
government legal advisor is quite the opposite. These lawyers have
historically taken great pride in their ability to assist policymakers
in identifying legally sound courses of action to achieve established
policy objectives. But good faith application of controlling legal
authority has always been the "first principle" of such an approach
to advising policymakers, and such alternate courses of action have
ultimately been responsive to the unyielding commitment to
ensure policy is adjusted to comply with law, not that law is adjusted
to facilitate policy. Nor is this a suggestion that all existing legal
constraints on policy are always logically and pragmatically sound.
But the response to such impediments must always be to seek
modifications in the law, not manipulation, marginalization, or
circumvention.
The fallout from this distortion of the relationship between law
and policy has been profound. Key legal opinions have been
withdrawn; key legal advisors have been discredited; senior career
legal advisors-such as the Judge Advocate Generals of the military
services-have stood in unison against their politically-appointed
counterparts to challenge and undo prior legal decisions and
associated executive branch policy decisions. But perhaps most
pernicious has been the uncertainty this approach has injected into
the operational decision-making realm.
Another significant, although more subtle, negative
consequence of this distortion was how the dubious legal analysis
flowing from the executive branch produced a loss of congressional
confidence and a resulting backlash in the form of legislating
operational standards. This was most apparent with regard to the
treatment of detainees, leading to the passage of the Detainee
Treatment Act. 49 Setting aside the question of whether the Act
actually achieved the asserted objectives of Congress, the mere fact
that Congress felt compelled to legislate in an area historically
entrusted to executive discretion reveals the extent of the loss of
confidence resulting from executive overreaching. These
legislative rebukes have not been limited to detainee treatment, but
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have extended to several other key areas of the Bush national
security policy. All of this reveals a truly unfortunate executive
branch deviation from the tradition of interpreting and applying
law in a manner consistent with its underlying purpose, and not in
a manner designed to "get to yes."
As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Robel in
1968, "[i]t would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national
defense, we would sanction the subversion of... those liberties...
which make the defense of the nation worthwhile."' 50 The first
bulwark against such subversion is preserving the traditional
understanding of the relationship between law and policy. Fidelity
to this "first principle" of the role of a government legal advisor
must begin at the highest levels of government. Without such an
understanding, legitimacy in the realm of national security will
invariably be the first casualty.
C. Tung Yin
From a structural perspective, I would say that the most
important issue in national security law (and national security
policy) today is the unfortunate mindset that focuses on addressing
problems of the past, rather than the future. This mindset
manifests itself, for example, in the crime/war debate about the
appropriate approach to dealing with al Qaeda, with one side
generally preferring to use pre-9/11 terrorism prosecutions as the
model, and with the other side using World War II as the model. I
do not mean to suggest that we should simply tear up the
Constitution, or that national security should always trump civil
liberties in the balancing act, but rather that reflexive pre-9/11
thinking, by either side, may be counterproductive.
D. Norman Abrams
The most important issue in national security law today is how
to fight terrorism without compromising the basic values of a free
society. But this formulation of the issue is too general to be
meaningful. The issue of striking the right balance between the
anti-terrorism effort and civil liberties needs context. Somewhat
narrower but still arguably too broad a formulation would focus on
executive authority: what are the limits on the President's authority
150. 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
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There are also other specific matters of serious concern that
might be considered for the title of the most important issue-for
example, the treatment and trials of the men detained in
Guantanamo, the extraordinary rendition of persons seized
abroad, the use of extreme methods of interrogation, or issues of
NSA eavesdropping. But these topics, while important, are too
narrow and focused to qualify for the "most important" title.
My candidate for the most important issue today in national
security law is the question of whether we should adopt special
rules, and if so, what kind, for dealing with persons suspected of
serious terrorism activity who are arrested in the United States.
Post 9/11, the Administration adopted a "we-are-at-war" basis
for treating individuals seized on the battlefield in Afghanistan and
elsewhere in the world, and used a similar basis for seizing Jose
Padilla and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri in the United States. But the
idea of putting persons arrested for terrorism activity in the United
States into military custody violates our traditions. If we reject the
military option, we are left with a choice: continuing to handle
serious terrorism cases arising in the United States in our normal
civilian criminal processes, or trying to develop a system of special
rules for dealing with such cases that meets constitutional norms
while improving our ability to fight terrorism. Developing such a
system poses a special challenge.
Why is this question so important? Because how it is answered
will determine not only the level at which the battle against
terrorism can be fought for the indefinite future, but also whether
we can conduct that fight without compromising the basic values of
our free society.
E. Amos Guiora
In the American paradigm, the most important issue in
national security law is how do we "move forward" post-Bush
administration. Put another way, how do we restore what I call two-
sided vigilance: vigilance against those who seek to randomly attack
and kill innocent civilians and vigilance against an unfettered
Executive.
Let me begin with the latter. Six and a half years after 9/11
the "scorecard" regarding respect for the rule of law is troubling.
The litany of the Bush administration's fundamental legal and
policy flaws have been discussed at length: the articulation and
20081 5077
71
Abrams et al.: Ten Questions on National Security
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2008
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
implementation of a torture-based interrogation regime, rendition
of detainees to nations whose torture practices were well known to
American decision makers, indefinite detention of detainees, lack
of independent judicial review, and denial of habeas corpus are but
the most obvious examples.
Hand in hand with these is what I suggest has been a largely
silent Congress, one that initially enabled the Administration to
conduct the so-called and misnamed "War on Terror" devoid of
congressional oversight. The Republican Congress granted
President Bush "carte blanche" in the aftermath of 9/11. The
results are the examples above.
Similarly, the Supreme Court (in the spirit of the late Chief
Justice Rehnquist's philosophy that "in times of armed conflict the
Court must be reticent") has-in large part-not been a forceful
nor timely practitioner of active judicial review of the Executive.
While Hamdan is perhaps this generation's Youngstown,"' it is also
important to recall that the Court only (finally?) announced its
decision in July 2006. That is, for almost five years, thousands of
individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism were held in a
largely rights-less regime before the Supreme Court decided that
the military commissions were fundamentally flawed.
Balancing legitimate national security considerations with
equally legitimate civil rights considerations is the essence of civil,
democratic regimes. A philosophy premised on "by all means
necessary" ensures an institutionalized imbalance that may well
result in "round up the usual suspects" and "guilt by association."
That is the danger that results from a failure to be vigilant both with
respect to a very real threat from terrorism and the danger that
results from an unfettered Executive. Justice Jackson's ageless
words of wisdom in Youngstown must be the "guiding light" by
which the next Administration, the Congress, the Court, the media,
and the public respond to the never-ending terrorism threat.
F Glenn Sulmasy and James D. Carlson
The critical issue in national security law of the 21st century is
that the West, led by the United States, needs to update its efforts
in fighting international terrorism. As such, we offer four steps to
turn the tide against al Qaeda and the rising threat of international
151. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
152. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 243 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Our public discourse about the "War on Terror" has become
stale and mired in hyperbole. The nation needs to forge a new
path in the armed conflict against al Qaeda. Six years into the
international armed conflict, the public debate is void of any fresh
ideas about how to move the country forward in the conflict of our
generation.
This lack of vision in the public debate is readily apparent as
the 2008 presidential race unfolds. We are deluged with debates,
commercials, and solicitations about minor issues, but there have
been no new ideas introduced to win the "War on Terror." In fact,
it rarely is discussed.
A new doctrine needs to be embraced by both policymakers
and the candidates. Reviewing, studying, and presenting new ideas
is not a partisan issue; but rather one that we, as a nation that
promotes human rights, must fully support. Our standing among
friends and foes alike has been tarnished. A new doctrine, with
four major components, is needed. They are:
1) Change the name of the war;
2) Morph the military commissions into a permanent national
security court;
3) Lead an international call for a convention to review the
Geneva Conventions to determine if, and how, the conventions
might be updated to meet the needs of handling the detainees
captured in the war; and
4) Make the recent FISA reforms permanent while striking the
right balance for the Terrorist Surveillance Program.
First, call the war what it is-a war against al Qaeda. From a
strategic level, this name change will help focus our efforts. We can
win a war against al Qaeda. It gives a face to the entity we fight. It
gives us the chance to defeat this enemy and to declare victory at
some point. As it now stands, the nebulous "War on Terror"
sounds all too similar to the "war on poverty" and the "war on
drugs," neither of which are "winnable."
Tactically, changing the name of the conflict will permit
decision makers in Washington to sharpen their efforts to provide
adequate resources. Legally, this titular change affords a more
concrete jurisprudential foundation to detain, interrogate, and
adjudicate crimes against the international terrorists. The
ambiguities as to the status of the detainees, as compared to
traditional POWs, remain a sore point with our allies. This will
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help remove some of the cynicism, both domestically and
internationally, about who we are detaining and will detain in the
future.
Second, create a standing terrorist court: the President, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of State all have declared
their desire to close Guantanamo Bay as a detention center. In
fact, all three leading Presidential candidates have also declared
their desire to close the Guantanamo Bay detention center. The
key, then, is to determine what judicial system can best handle
these unique cases. A natural maturation from the Military
Commissions Act would be a hybrid court-a mix of both the
military commissions and the Article III federal courts. The war
itself is unique-it requires a mixture of both a law enforcement
response as well as a military response. These are hybrid warriors
in a hybrid war-thus, there is a need for a new hybrid court to
better detain, interrogate, and adjudicate their cases.
Third, lead the call for an international conference to review
the Geneva Conventions: this is a global conflict, and as such, we
need to have consensus from our global partners on to how to
proceed. The United States should determine if a new protocol
might be necessary to identify and handle the al Qaeda
international terrorists as they are different from both traditional
warriors and terrorists seeking national revolution or other
domestic political changes.
Finally, update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA): few disagree that there needs to be some intelligence
collection program conducting surveillance overseas. However,
controversy has arisen when some of these "intercepts" include U.S.
citizens. FISA was drafted in 1978-before computers, cell phones,
and other electronic means of communication. During the fall
session of the Congress, clear guidelines need to be created for
FISA and the reforms legislated last session need to be made
permanent. In doing so, however, we must balance our
constitutional and human rights obligations with our legitimate
national security needs.
These four cornerstones of a new strategy are critical to
moving the debate forward and to fighting the war. Instead of
battling over what already has occurred, we need to be debating
what to do in the future as al Qaeda plans its next major attack
upon the U.S. homeland. These issues are the most critical in
national security law today.
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